208 Methods of Election. 



B, C, D, . . P, maybe excluded one after another on the suc- 

 cessive scrutinies, and at the final scrutiny the contest will be 

 between Q and R, and Q, of course, wins, since we have 

 supposed him better than R in the opinion of the electors, 

 Thus the single vote method may return the worst of all the 

 candidates ; and although Ware's method cannot return the 

 worst, it may return the next worst. 



A great point in favour of Ware's method is that it is 

 quite impossible for an astute elector to gain any advantage 

 for a favourite candidate by placing a formidable com- 

 petitor at the bottom of the list. On account of its sim- 

 plicity, Ware's method is extremely suitable for political 

 elections. In cases of party contests, the strongest party is 

 sure to win, no matter how many candidates are brought 

 forward. The successful candidate, however, will not always 

 be the one most acceptable to his own party. 



The Venetian Method. 



For the sake of simplicity, I describe this method for the 

 case of three candidates only. Two scrutinies are held ; at 

 the first scrutiny eacli elector has two votes, which are given 

 to the two candidates, one to each, who stand highest in the 

 elector's order of preference. The candidate who has fewest 

 votes is then rejected, and a final scrutiny is held between 

 the two remaining candidates. At the final scrutiny each 

 elector has one vote, which is given to that one of the 

 remaining candidates who stands highest in the elector's 

 order of preference. The candidate who obtains most votes 

 at the final scrutiny is elected. 



This method is very faulty; it may lead to the rejection of 

 a candidate who has an absolute majority of the electors in 

 his favour. For we have seen, in discussing the double vote 

 method^ that such a candidate may be rejected at the first 

 scrutiny. In fact, unless the candidate who has fewest votes 

 at the first scrutiny has less than N votes, where 2N is 

 the number of electors, we cannot be sure the result is 

 correct. For, for anything we can tell, the candidate who is 

 rejected at the first scrutiny may be, in the opinion of an 

 absolute majority of the electors, the best man for the post. 

 If, however, the candidate who has fewest votes on the first 

 scrutiny has less than N votes, then the method will certainly 

 give a correct result. For, since there are only three candi- 

 dates, to require an elector to vote for two candidates comes 

 to exactly the same thing as to ask him to vote against one 



