Methods of Election. 209 



candidate. Now, if with the two votes any candidate get 

 less than N votes, it is clear that there are more than N 

 votes against him, for each candidate must be marked first, 

 or second, or third on each paper. Thus, in the opinion of 

 an absolute majority, the candidate is worse than each of the 

 other candidates, and, therefore, ought not to be elected. 

 Unless, therefore, the lowest candidate has less than N votes, 

 this method violates the fundamental condition. 



I do not know that the method has ever been used in the 

 form here described ; but in the still more objectionable form 

 of the second class, which differs from the one just described 

 only by dispensing with the preferential voting paper, and 

 allowing the electors to vote again after the result of the 

 first scrutiny is known, it is exceedingly common, and is 

 frequently used by committees. An instance which was 

 fully reported in the Melbourne papers occurred some time 

 ago in the selection of a candidate to stand on the constitu- 

 tional side at the last election for Boroondara. It is fair, 

 however, to say that the result of the method appears to 

 have been correct in that case ; but that was due to accident, 

 and not to the method itself. 



If there be more than three candidates the method is very 

 complicated, and the defects are more serious. It seems, 

 however, hardly worth while going into any details in these 

 cases. 



Condoecet's Pkactical Method. 



This method was proposed in 1793 by Coudorcet, and 

 appears to have been used for some time at Geneva. It is 

 described at pp. 36 — 41 of vol. xv. of Condorcet's collected 

 works (edition of 1804), and may be used in the case of 

 any number of candidates for any number of vacancies. 

 We are at present concerned only with the case of a single 

 vacancy; and for the sake of simplicity I describe Condorcet's 

 method for the case in which there are only three can- 

 didates. 



Two scrutinies may be necessary in order to ascertain the 

 result of the election in this method. At the first scrutiny 

 one vote is counted for each first place assigned to a candi- 

 date, and if any candidate obtains an absolute majority of 

 the votes counted he is elected. But if no one obtain such 

 an absolute majority a second scrutiny is held. At the 

 second scrutiny one vote is counted for each first place, and 

 one vote for each second place, exactly as in the first 



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