232 Methods of Election. 



to B and C. Now, as we are only concerned with the 

 differences of the totals polled for each candidate, we see 

 that the result of the first scrutiny will be the same if we 

 take away \ a 1 votes from each candidate. Thus the result 

 will come out the same if we give f a 1 votes to A, and none 

 to B or C, so far as the plumpers are concerned. Similarly 

 the result will not be altered if the b l plumpers for B be 

 counted, as § b l votes for B and nothing for C and A, and so 

 for C's plumpers. Thus the final result will be in accordance 

 with the views of the electors, if each plumper be reckoned 

 as three halves of a vote 



The assumption that the electors who plump for A are 

 equally divided as to the merits of B and C, appears to be 

 perfectly legitimate, for the electors have an opportunity of 

 stating their preference, if they have one, and as they have, 

 in the case supposed, declined to express any, it may be 

 fairly concluded that they have none. 



At the final scrutiny (if held), all plumpers for the candi- 

 date who has been rejected will have no effect. 



If there be more than three candidates, and incomplete 

 papers are presented, we should have to make a similar 

 assumption, viz., that in all cases where the preference is 

 not fully expressed, the elector has no preference as regards 

 the candidates whom he has omitted to mark on his voting 

 paper. Thus, for example, if there be four candidates, 

 A, B, C, D, a plumper for A ought to count as two votes for 

 A and none for B, C, D. Again, a voting paper on which 

 A is marked first and B second, and on which no other 

 names are marked, ought to count as two and ahalf votes 

 for A and three halves of a vote for B. If there be more 

 than four candidates the varieties of incomplete papers 

 would be more numerous, and the weights to be allotted to 

 each would be given by more complicated rules. Prac- 

 tically it would be best to count one vote for each plumper 

 in the case in which only one candidate is marked on a 

 voting paper; one for the last, and two for the first, when 

 two names only are marked on a voting paper ; one for the 

 last, two for the next, and three for the first, when three 

 names only are marked on a voting paper, and so on, giving 

 in all cases one vote to the candidate marked lowest on any 

 paper, and as many votes to the candidate marked first as 

 there are names marked on the paper. By this means the 

 rules for computing the votes would be the same in all 

 cases and at all scrutinies. We have seen, it is true, that 



