Methods of Election. 233 



this method may lead to error. The error has the effect of 

 decreasing the votes for the candidates who are marked on 

 any incomplete paper, and it arises solely in consequence of the 

 papers being incomplete. Thus, if the electors do not fully 

 express their preference, the effect is to injure the chances 

 of their favourite candidates. If, then, we adopt the plan 

 just described for incomplete papers, it will be sufficiently 

 simple for practical purposes, and its use will tend to elicit 

 from electors a full statement of their various preferences. 



Cases of Equality. 



No case of equality can occur in the proposed method 

 except when all the candidates poll exactly the same 

 number of votes on a scrutiny, for if less than the whole 

 number of candidates have the same number of votes in any 

 scrutiny, if that common number be not greater than the 

 average, all the equal candidates are excluded. If it be 

 greater, no one of them is excluded ; and in either case we 

 pass on to another scrutiny. 



If on any scrutiny all the candidates poll exactly the 

 same number of votes, that number, of course, must be the 

 average, and it is necessary that some one should have 

 ■a casting vote. If it is thought proper to do so, one casting 

 vote can then be made to settle the election, by allowing the 

 casting vote to decide who is to win. But if it is thought 

 that this is giving too much weight to the casting vote, then 

 we may permit the casting vote to decide who is to be 

 excluded, and then proceed to a fresh scrutiny between the 

 remaining candidates. It will be observed, however, that 

 the chance of a casting vote being required at any scrutiny 

 except the last, when only two candidates remain, is very 

 minute, seeing that it depends upon all the candidates 

 polling exactly the same number of votes on a scrutiny. 



Statement of Method. 



It is convenient to give here a formal statement of the 

 method which it is proposed should be used when incom- 

 plete papers are presented. 



Each elector is furnished with a list of the candidates in 

 alphabetical order, upon which he indicates his preference 

 amongst the candidates by placing the figure one opposite 

 the name of the candidate of his first choice, the figure two 

 opposite the name of the next in order of preference, the 



