. On page 13, third line from the bottom of the page, "Rank- 

 sian" should be Banksian. 



In the key to the species, page 20, lines 7 and 8 were trans 

 posed. They should have appeared as follows: 



Leaves linear-lanceolate to linear-oblong microphylla 2. 



Leaves lanceolate-oblong, tapering to both ends; flowers 

 small and slender argentea 18. 



Following the description of Z . Pringlei Eastw., page 26, the 

 specimen examined was omitted. 



Specimen Examined. 

 Los Pinitos, Sonora, Mexico, Oct. 12, 1890, 6100 ft. alt., 

 C. V. Hartman, No. 144. (UC). 



THE IMMATERIAL BASIS OF HEREDITY 

 By James R. Allen 



It seems quite remarkable that the science of heredity has benefited so 

 little from the wonderful researches, during the last two decades, in the de- 

 partments of physics and chemistry. It is not putting the matter too strongly 

 to say that, while the. brilliant results in the new chemistry of our day have 

 been so startling and far-reaching as to practically revolutionize our customary 

 modes of scientific thinking, the old problem of vital inheritance remains very 

 much the same as it was a quarter of a century ago. Why this should be true, 

 when there is so much new and excellent data at hand with which to place the 

 science of heredity on an entirely new foundation, is difficult to understand. 

 If we would but make good use of the wealth of material with which physics 

 and chemistry now supply us, there is no longer the need, nor excuse, to begin 

 our researches in heredity at a point higher up than the electronif bases upon 

 which has been reared the modern structure of physica) scienc/ 



The entire problem of vital inheritance rests, primarily, upon the consti- 

 tution of matter; and our concepts of hereditary units should be in accord 

 with the latest and highest achievements in physical science. Whatever hypo- 

 thesis we assume as to the constitution of the atom, the same must be em- 

 ployed by the biologist as the basis of heredity; and all our theories to ac- 

 count for persistence of type, or variations therefrom, must be grounded upon 

 and developed out of the hypothetical nature which we accord to the so-called 

 ultimate "material unit." 



An epitome of the numerous and remarkable discoveries of the past decade 

 in physical science clearly reveals their revolutionary character and tendency. 

 The general trend of this tendency is, unquestionably, toward immaterializmg 

 the essential nature of matter. Nothing whatever exists corresponding to the 

 ordinary conception of a material particle. The "atom" of the science of yes- 

 terday has passed into the limbo of the manifestly impossible. The "electronic 

 atom" that has usurped its place is a gross misnomer, and bears_ much the 

 same relation to the old concept as does a vacuum to the container in which it 

 is enclosed. 



The quest for the ultimate material unit is ever abortive and disappoint- 

 ing; and, probably, for the good and sufficient reason that such a thmg 

 does not exist. Recent discoveries along this line of inquiry strongly indicate 

 the futility of such a search. It seems like a chase after the fabulous bags of 

 gold at the foot of the rainbow. If scientists were always as good philosophers 

 as they are physicists and chemists, they would have suspected, long ago, that 

 their preconceived notions of what matter must essentially be have painted a 

 mirage across their scientific vision, to mislead and deceive. _ Philosophically, an 

 indivisible material particle, however minute, is an impossibility. Its size could 



