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together into one Museum such as this, a sufficient number of objects of all 

 kinds, arrayed, so far as possible, according to the dates of their production. 

 The latter is, of course, the greatest difficulty. But an object whose approxi- 

 mate date is known, is worth a dozen about which we know nothing. Every 

 effort therefore ought to be made to collect those objects, such as spears and 

 meres, which are known by the Maoris to have been in existence for several 

 generations. I think it quite possible that enough might be done to establish 

 something like the law of change in Maori Art ; and theu we should be able 

 to answer the second question ; — is this an Art in advance or decay ? Is it in 

 a period of growth or of decadence? Is this grotesque ornamentation the work 

 of a people struggling out of primitive ignorance towards a higher perfection t 

 or is it the fragment of a higher art from which the soul has departed, and of 

 which the traditions have been imperfectly preserved, by a people which has 

 relapsed into barbarism 1 I venture not to offer any theory ujwn the subject, 

 but I cannot but think that the subject is one full of interest and instruction, 

 and that it is within the scope of such an institution as this to collect the materials 

 which shall enable some competent archaeologist to do for Maori Art, what Sir 

 George Grey has so ably done for Maori literature. 



I have endeavoured to show the relations in which Art stands to physical 

 law, and to explain its limits. I have also shown how it is incorporated into 

 and forms an important part of the external history of man. I proceed now 

 to enquire what are the relations which exist between Art and the subjects of 

 the other intellectual and moral powers of man. 



That upon which Art is based, without which it could not exist is the 

 natural and inherent capacity in man to distinguish the beautiful from the 

 ugly ; — that quality in his soul which has an affinity for the one, and revolts 

 from the other. And I lay this down as an undeniable truth, that such a 

 capacity is an essential part of the organization of man, in spite of the fact 

 constantly presented to us, that not only individual men, but whole ages and 

 races of men, have derived pleasure from forms and ideas, which to other men 

 and other times have been utterly painful and repugnant. Hence it is that, 

 even amongst cultivated men, we hear the heresy constantly repeated, that 

 Art is all a matter of taste, and that that is beautiful to each man which he 

 feels to be so. And so upon no subject, except perhaps religion, is there so 

 much unsettled opinion as in matters of Art. In the philosophy of Art, as in 

 religion, men range between the extreme limits of a superstitioiis reverence 

 for authority on the one hand, and, on the other, a sceptical rejection of 

 everything outside an individual, and mostly an ignorant, private judgment. 



But does it not seem a sounder philosophy to believe that this great, 

 distinctive, and powerful capacity of the soul — this affinity for the beautiful — 

 is cognate to other capacities and powers of our being 1 We have a capacity 

 for distinguishing abstract truth from error ; and we do not doubt that truth 

 is truth, and error error, because the majority of men are only partially capable 

 of perceiving the distinction. We have a capacity for distinguishing right 

 from wrong in morals ; and we do not conclude that there is no right or 

 wrong, because whole races and generations of men have failed to recognise 

 which was which. Why, then, should we argue that there is no standard or 

 test of the beautiful beyond individual and undeveloped judgment? Man does 

 not create the essence or principle of beauty, any more than he does that of 

 abstract truth, or of moral goodness. He only recognises it and assimilates it. 

 If he fails to do so ; if he takes that for the beautiful which is not so ; if he 

 worships false gods ; it is not that the nature of the object is altered, but that 

 his powers are either undeveloped or depraved. Is it not rather the case that 

 all the spiritual and intellectual organs in man are subject to the same law 

 which obtains in the material organs of all animated nature, in that they are 



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