'10 



44 



THE BEGINNINGS OF LIFE. 



as Mr. Herbert Spencer has so clearly pointed out^ 



in the evolution of Mind we each one of us 



5 



expe- 



rience the constant transitions whereby a state or act 

 (the recurrence of which was at first always attended 

 by consciousness) at last, when thoroughly familiar 

 may take place quite unconsciously, or without in 



the least 



arousing 



our attention. The more 



fully 



such phenomena, therefore, are recognized as parts 

 of an orderly succession, by which alone greater and 

 greater complexities of thought and feeling are rendered 

 possible, the more will it become evident that the 

 sphere of Mind cannot at any time be circumscribed by 

 the then present or possible states of Consciousness 

 the more it is obvious that in our conception of Mind 

 we should also include all past stages of Consciousness, 

 the representatives of which, now in the form of un- 

 conscious nerve-actions, are from moment to moment 

 manifesting themselves potentially, if not actually, in 

 all our present Thoughts, Feelings, and Volitions. 



But though on the question whether Consciousness 

 or Feeling is to be regarded as a possible accompani- 



place under the form of a mere organic or unconscious discrimtnation 

 without the intervention of consciousness. Thus, in the individual, con- 

 sciousness or feeling comes to be superadded as an additional accom- 

 paniment to certain mere organic discriminations ; so that consciousness, 

 without which sensation cannot exist, is secondary, whilst cognition, in 

 the form of unconscious discrimination, is primary. Out of this primary 

 undifferentiated organic discrimination, such as alone pertains to the lowest 

 forms of animal life, there has been gradually evolved that which \ve 

 know as Feeling and Consciousness.' 



1 / Principles of Psychology,' 1855, pp. 563 and 616. 



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for 



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doubt 

 various 



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not to 

 changes 



be con SI 



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as a 



wb 



elude; as Mr. Spe 



ia a sup 



erior ner 



way 



an objsctivi 

 subjective change 

 equivalence betwi 

 is proportionate 

 ination that takes 

 fected. But the 



(luantitative relat 

 transformatio 



n II 



c 



f^l disturbaace 

 same writer alsi 



and the i 



inner fee 



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'^tion as that 

 ''^^ the two do 



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ent 



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yvh 



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