Fkankland. — On the Doctrine of Mind-Stiiff. 205 



is clearly less than was all tlie material inside its orbit. If its original 

 orbit had been such that, when at perihelion, it occupied such a position 

 that, were it to return to the same place, on its return nearly all the matter 

 would be outside its orbit, there would be scarcely any central attraction. 

 Therefore, it would not come to that position, but must keep a long way 

 from the centre ; in other words, its orbit has become enormously more 

 circular, or less eccentric. 



I will only, in this paper, call attention to the enormous mass of evi- 

 dence that is accumulating respecting the change of forms, and the sudden 

 appearance and disappearance of nebulae ; proving that they are not distant 

 universes, and also giving great probability to the theory of their origin, 

 which this paper suggests. 



Art. XYII. — On the Doctrine of Mind-Stuff. By Fkederick W. Fkankland. 



[Read before the Wellington Philosophical Society, 27th Septemher, 1879.] 

 The objects of the present paper are, to describe briefly a theory or doctrine 

 of existence, expounded by the late Prof. Clifford, in an article " On the 

 Nature of Things m Themselves," but arrived at independently by several 

 persons — amongst others by myself, as far back as the year 1870, — and to 

 propound and assist toward the solution of a series of problems which arise 

 in connection with this theory. 



The starting-point of the theory is the position, commonly associated 

 with the names of Berkeley and Hume, that all the properties of material 

 objects, as investigated by the physical and natural sciences, are cajjable of 

 being analysed into possibilities of feeling, or relations among possibilities 

 of feeling. Thus the redness of a rose is the possibility of a certain visual 

 sensation, and the roundness of an orange is a complex of relations among 

 the possibilities of certain visual, tactual, and muscular sensations. Grant- 

 ing this position, it obviously follows that every assertion of physical science 

 — every assertion, that is, respecting matter, force, or motion — is merely an 

 assertion respecting possibilities of sensation or feeling. The truth of this 

 position is demonstrated by a process of self-observation or introspection, 

 and must be verified by each individual for himself. It is believed by the 

 present writer that the conclusion arrived at cannot be resisted by any mind 

 which performs the requisite process of self-analysis with perfect precision 

 and faithfulness. 



The only concrete realities, therefore — the only " things-in-themselves " 

 that we know of, are feelings. Psychology is the only concrete science. 

 The word "feeling" is used here to denote any mental state whatever. 



