JVanklAnd. — On the Doctrine of Mind'Stuf. 207 



the language of metaphysics, an object (even if it be the farthest fixed star) 

 is an abstraction the primary reference of which is to a concrete something 

 inside the mdividual's consciousness, namely a certain group of his own 

 sensations ; while its appearance of externality is derived from the fact that 

 it also refers to actual or possible sensations outside his consciousness, 

 namely in the consciousness of other beings who do or might exist. These 

 other streams of consciousness, and not the earth, air, and sky, are the true 

 " External World " to each individual. The outsideness or externality of 

 these " other streams of consciousness," of which each one among us infers 

 the existence, and of the feelings composing them, appears to me to be 

 very happily expressed in the term by which Prof. Clifford has proposed 

 to denote them, namely the term eject. The minds of my readers are 

 "ejects" to me, and my mind is an " eject" to them. The use of this term 

 also places in marked contrast the genuine outsideness of these inferred 

 existences with the pseudo-externality, so to speak, of the material universe. 



So far, nothing new has been enunciated. The thmkers of the school 

 to which I belong, maintain that, paradoxical as some of the above asser- 

 tions may sound, (for instance, the denial of the concrete existence of 

 matter,) the common sense of mankind will bear us out m them, if only its 

 deliverances be analysed and formulated with precision. It is only when 

 we take a further step that our doctrine parts company with the belief of 

 the unuistructed. This further step is taken in answer to the question : 

 " Are there ejects which form no part of any consciousness? Are there 

 non-personal ejects?" and to the further question: "If so, what is their 

 nature ?" 



Are there ejects which form no part of any consciousness ? In other 

 words, besides the consciousnesses of intelligent beings, each with its rich 

 phantasmagoria of sensations, and its varied wealth of ideas and emotions, 

 are there any real existences ? My readers wiU immediately reply, "To be 

 sure. There is the earth, with all the material objects on its sui-face, there 

 are the sun, moon, and stars, and, in fact, the whole material universe?" 

 This, however, would be a reply which would not meet the question at aU. 

 For, as indicated in the first portion of this paper, if any one will honestly 

 examine the nature of his conceptions respecting material objects, he will 

 find that they resolve themselves wholly into conceptions of possibilities of 

 sensation in himself and in other sentient beings who do, or might, exist : and, 

 if all these possibilities of sensation be abstracted, he will be much puzzled 

 to attach a meaning to the assertion that there is a residuary existence 

 behind. It wiU not suffice, therefore, to answer the question by merely 

 affir min g the existence of a material universe : we must also state whether 

 we believe that, besides the possibilities of sensation, and the relations 



