EiCHMOND. — Reply to Mr. FranhlamVs imper on '^ Mind- Stuff.'" 217 



tendency, it is removed by the proposal to transfer to the description and 

 investigation of mental phenomena such notions as "mass," "motion," 

 "velocity," "momentum." To me, I confess, the proposal appears desti- 

 tute of possible meaning. The notion of extension is obviously involved in 

 every one of these terms. In om- " matter-moulded forms of speech" all 

 these ideas are applied metaphoricaUy to spiritual existence, and the things 

 of the pm'e intellect. But we are conscious of the metaphor. We speak 

 of a massive intellect ; but would not gravely af&rm that Cuvier's under- 

 standing weighed precisely 64 ozs. Because we talk of " a rapid intuition," 

 we do not suppose ourselves able to compute, in terms of space as well as 

 time, the speed of those glances of the mind compared with which "the 

 tempest itseK lags behind, and the swift-winged arrows of light." The Mate- 

 riahzing School, in treating of the emotions, in which our bodily frame 

 co-operates with our mental constitution, often make use, with marked 

 predilection, of language properly apphcable only in the field of Physics, — 

 and we hear continually of "waves," "currents," "vibrations," and the 

 like. But into the proper region of the inteUect they do not venture on 

 importing the idea of space. Professor Bain, in his " Compendium of 

 Mental and Moral Science," recognizes, in limine, the grand division of 

 human knowledge into the two departments of Matter and Mind, — or, as 

 he prefers to call them. Object and Subject. " The department of the 

 Object, or Object-world, is," he says, " exactly circumscribed by one pro- 

 perty, extension. The world of Subject-experience is devoid of this 

 property." 



Mr. Frankland adduces the sensation of general weariness as an instance 

 of a mental phenomenon, involving the perception of volume or massive- 

 ness ; wliich includes the idea of extension. But this is a physical sensa- 

 tion, and no instance of a purely mental experience. Our own hmbs and 

 body are as much a portion of the external world as any other part of it. 

 Unquestionably the sense of weariness is always, more or less, definite in 

 extent. We may feel our legs tired, or our arms and back, or th-ed all over. 

 Just in the same way we recognize in sensation, more or less exactly, the 

 extent of a wound or burn. To prove what is wanted, an instance must be 

 found of a pm-ely mental emotion or operation, unconnected with any 

 corporeal feeling. But we are certainly not conscious of the extent in 

 square sm-face, or cubic space, of our love, hatred, remorse, regret ; or of 

 any process or result of the reasoning power. To these, terms of intension, 

 which are dynamical, not material, may be apphed ; but never terms of 

 extension. 



But I pass on to consider the vahdity of the induction — shall I call it, 

 or the fidelity of the intuition — upon which the new doctrine is to be 



21 



