LAW; — ITS DEFINITIONS. 87 



to Metaphysics or Theology. Thus in the very 

 able Harveian Oration for 1865 by Dr H. W. Ack- 

 land, he says — " Whether there be any Purpose, is 

 the object of Theological and Metaphysical, but 

 not of Physical inquiry."* And again, " The evi- 

 dence of intention is metaphysical, and depends 

 on probabilities. It is not positive. It is inferen- 

 tial from many considerations." -f- I venture to dis- 

 sent from these conclusions. Even as a general 

 doctrine, the doctrine of Contrivance and Adjust- 

 ment is not so metaphysical as the Doctrine of 

 Homologies; and when we come to particular cases 

 there can be no question whatever that the rela- 

 tion of a given Structure to its Purpose and Func- 

 tion comes more unequivocally under the class of 

 physical facts than the relation of that same Struc- 

 ture to some corresponding part in another ani- 

 mal. It is less ideal, for example, — less theoretical 

 — less metaphysical — to assert of the little hooked 

 claw which is attached to the (apparent) elbow 

 of a Bat's wing, that it was placed there to enable 

 the Bat to climb and crawl, than to affirm of that 

 same claw that it is the homologue of the human 

 * P. 61. t P. 63. 



