IN THE REALM OF MIND. 305 



phenomena of Mind, and it is these alone, of which 

 we are directly cognisant, and it is from these that 

 we must start as the basis of all Psychological re- 

 search. This is true even of those phenomena of 

 the mind which are most purely animal. Sensa- 

 tion, for example, may be traced with absolute 

 demonstration to certain nerves. This may throw 

 a new light on the method by which Sensation is 

 rendered possible; but it throws no new light what- 

 ever upon what Sensation is. It is that which we 

 know and feel it to be, and it is neither more nor 

 less since the knife of the anatomist has laid bare 

 the channels along which it comes. Still more is 

 this true of the Intellectual Powers. Yet there are 

 Philosophers who appear to think that some new 

 light is cast upon Sensation when they call it an 

 affection of the " Sensory Ganglia ; " that Thought 

 is in some measure explained when it is called a 

 " Cerebration," and that the Laws of Intellect are 

 reduced to scientific expression when they are 

 described as the working of the " Cerebral Gan- 

 glia." All this is a mere idle play on words. It 

 is an attempt to put that first which must be last, 



and that last which must be first. The general 



U 



