336 THE REIGN OF LAW 



have resulted at last in some real progress upon 

 this vexed question of Necessity and Free-will. 

 That progress lies mainly in a clearer definition 

 of terms. The most eminent living philosopher 

 who represents the doctrine, commonly called 

 the Doctrine of Necessity, repudiates that name 

 as incorrect, expressly on the ground that the 

 word Necessity, as commonly applied, signifies 

 compulsion. Undoubtedly it does ; and if this 

 meaning be repudiated, then the word is not used 

 in its ordinary and legitimate sense. This, in- 

 deed, Mr Mill confesses, whilst yet he casts 

 upon his opponents the blame of a misunder- 

 standing, which assuredly lies with those who do 

 not employ ordinary words in the ordinary signifi- 

 cation. " The truth is," he says, " that the assail- 

 ants of the doctrine (of Necessity) cannot do with- 

 out the associations engendered by the double 

 meaning of the word Necessity, which in this ap- 

 plication signifies only invariability, bnt in its 

 common employment, compulsion."* He believes, 

 therefore, in Necessity only in the sense of In- 



* Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, by J. S. 

 Mill, p. 492, note. 



