IN THE REALM OF MIND. 337 



variability. But if the doctrine which Mr Mill 

 favours has suffered from one ambiguity, it seeks 

 shelter itself under the protection of another am- 

 biguity much more deceptive. If there is a double 

 meaning in the word Necessity which has exposed 

 the Necessitarian doctrine to unjust objections, it 

 is equally true that there is a double meaning 

 in the word Invariability which lends to that doc- 

 trine an undue advantage. For, as in the language 

 of this philosophy, Necessity does not mean com- 

 pulsion, so neither does Invariability mean the 

 exclusion of variety. By Invariability, as applied 

 to the phenomena of Mind, Mr Mill simply means 

 that, in respect to mental action, there is an 

 " abstract possibility of its being foreseen/' " If," 

 he says, "necessity means more than this abstract 

 possibility of being foreseen ; if it means any mys- 

 terious compulsion, apart from simple invariability 

 of sequence, I deny it as strenuously as any one."* 

 But now let us insist, as in such subjects we are 

 bound to do, on still clearer definitions. We shall 

 then find that this favourite phrase, " invariability 

 of sequence," is as ambiguous as others of the same 



* Examination of Sir W. Hamilton's Philosophy, p. 517. 



Y 



