338 THE REIGN OF LAW 



class. It does not mean that any particular se- 

 quences are invariable, but only that there must 

 always be some sequence — that it is invariably true 

 that everything which happens has proceeded from 

 something as a cause, and leads to something as a 

 consequence. But this is a proposition which evi- 

 dently, when reduced to its true dimensions, has no 

 adverse bearing whatever on the doctrine of Free 

 Will. The abstract possibility of foreseeing men- 

 tal or physical action depends on the proposition, 

 that where all the conditions of mental action 

 are constant, the resulting action will be constant 

 also. But surely this is not only true, but some- 

 thing very like a truism.* There is nothing to 

 object to or deny in the doctrine, that if we knew 

 everything that determines the conduct of a man, 



* Mr Mansel, following other philosophers on this point, re- 

 duces the modified doctrine of Necessity to this identical proposi- 

 tion, " that the prevailing motive prevails." Mr Mill's reply seems 

 very obscure and unsatisfactory. (Examination of Sir W. Hamil- 

 ton's Philosophy, pp. 518, 519.) I cannot help adding, however, 

 on the other hand, that Mr Mill appears to me to have exposed 

 with great force and clearness the verbal fallacies involved in Mr 

 Mansel's work on the "Limits of Religious Thought," and espe- 

 cially in the use he makes of such forms of expression as " The 

 Absolute," "The Infinite," &c. See the chapter (vii.) on "The 

 Philosophy of the Conditioned as applied by Mr Mansel to Re- 

 ligion," in the same work. 



