IN THE REALM OF MIND. 343 



Will with the idea of Causation, is not really so 

 great a difficulty as the use of ambitious and 

 ambiguous language has made it appear to be. 

 There are two sentences in Mr J. S. Mill's work, 

 on the Philosophy of Comte, which afford the 

 best possible illustration both of the true doc- 

 trine on the relation in which Will stands to Law, 

 and of the false doctrine into which it may be 

 merged by the ambiguous use of words. In one 

 passage Mr Mill defines the Positive as distin- 

 guished from the Theological Mode of Thought to 

 be — " that all phenomena, without exception, are 

 governed by invariable laws, with which no voli- 

 tions cither natural or supernatural interfere!'* It 

 is at least satisfactory to find in this sentence so 

 clear an avowal that the idea of free Divine Voli- 

 tion in the region of the Supernatural, and the 

 idea of free Human Volition in the region of the 

 Natural, stand on the same ground, are exposed 

 to the same intellectual difficulties, and are both 

 equally denied by the new Philosophy. But as 

 a definition of the Positive mode of thought it 

 stands in curious contrast with another passage 



* 



Aug. Comte and Positivism, p. 12. 



