348 I HE REIC.N OF LAW 



the ordinary use of the word, are eliminated and 

 set aside. We have seen one instance of this in 

 the word " necessity," emptied of its meaning of 

 compulsion. We have another example in the use 

 made of such words as " changeable," and others 

 of a like kind. Thus Mr Mill* quotes, with ap- 

 probation, a remark of Comte, that " our power of 

 foreseeing phenomena, and of our power of con- 

 trolling them, are the two things which destroy 

 the belief of their being governed by changeable 

 Wills." All through this sentence there run the 

 same confusions which have been pointed out in 

 the two sentences already quoted. But there is, 

 in addition, another confusion which has a special 

 bearing on the subject of this chapter. Pheno- 

 mena which can be controlled are phenomena 

 which can be changed. There is no other mean- 

 ing in the words. The assertion, therefore, is, that 

 the changeability of phenomena through human 

 agency is a fact which must destroy our belief in 

 the changeability of the human Will itself. The 

 ntence thus rendered is, of course, either pure 

 nonsense, or else must be dependent for a rational 



* Aug. Comte and Positivism, p. 48. 



