SPECIES AND RACE. 31 



of arguments drawn from analogy alone, while insisting that 

 no true analogies can be said to exist. Every animal f from 

 null/ ti> tin- ii'orm, is governed by special physiological laws. . . . 

 The rules current among breeders of domestic animals have 

 been considered as applicable to man, but the notion itself is 

 very unphilosophical and could never have originated with any 

 intelligent naturalist of thorough experience ." 



This analogy has, nevertheless, been generally recognized as 

 a legitimate mode of argumentation. Even in the same work 

 from which we have quoted, Agassiz declares that it must be 

 considered as proved that the laws which govern the variation 

 of type in animals are "in the same limits and the same 

 degree" applicable to mankind. If we were to ask for the 

 proofs of this, and why the inferences of Blumenbach are 

 rejected, it may be long before we receive an intelligible 

 answer. 



However clearly it may be demonstrated that the differences 

 between the various types of mankind are not greater than 

 those produced in animals by the influences of climate, food, 

 etc., this circumstance in favour of the unity of mankind should 

 not be over estimated, because the justification for such a parallel 

 is doubtful. Not only is the comparison of differences found in 

 specifically different individuals uncertain, but it is inadmissible, 

 because it includes the assumption that the range of variation 

 for all, or not very remote species, is nearly the same. De 

 Candolle, as quoted above, has shown that sometimes indivi- 

 dual varieties within the same species exhibit more considerable 

 diversities than different species themselves ; to which may be 

 added the remarks of Swainson* on the diversities which esta- 

 blish specific differences, that there are constant specific differ- 

 ences which seem much less marked than many diversities of 

 race. If the latter were really confined to narrower limits than 

 specific differences, we might possess a pretty certain and con- 

 venient distinctive mark between race and species ; but such is 

 not the case : e.g., the variability of the ape, so closely approx- 

 imating man, is far from being so extensive as that possessed 



1 Loc. cit., pp. 275, 35. 



