SECT. III.] INFLUENCE OF KNOWLEDGE ON RELIGION. 379 



gress of knowledge. Although a progressive knowledge of na- 

 ture does not at once destroy the spiritualisation of the sensible 

 world, it gradually limits it. Diseases are no longer considered as 

 the effects of evil spirits, the number of which is gradually 

 lessened, until reduced to one devil. The local gods, also, are 

 considerably reduced. The remaining gods, formerly spectral 

 and capricious, are now differently conceived ; they are more 

 spiritualised, and are endowed with a more specific character, 

 their actions have more design, they receive a symbolical sig- 

 nification, so that a connected mythology is established which 

 promotes the plastic arts. The more man is enlightened by the 

 torch of knowledge, and perceives that the ethic-aesthetical in- 

 terests form the centre of his destination, the more his gods, 

 either from analogy to himself or to his ideals, acquire an 

 ethic-aesthetic signification, until at length their number no 

 longer corresponds with his improved notions of the unity and 

 design of the world, and he abandons polytheism. 



These illustrations must suffice to show that it is essentially 

 the development of knowledge which is the moving power, all 

 other forces being secondary. Nevertheless, it cannot be 

 denied that it is attended by some injurious effects. In every 

 branch, of human science, ignorance is first replaced by a series 

 of errors which surround certain truths. Though many of 

 these errors may, separately, be harmless enough, they become 

 highly dangerous when they affect the passions of man. The 

 danger and destructiveness of knowledge grows in proportion 

 to its superiority above others. Kefined wickedness is fre- 

 quently the result of intellectual development. Knowledge 

 itself may rouse the passions, by leading to disputes, giving 

 rise to vanity and over-weening pride. Again, every new fact 

 is over-valued, transferred by false analogies to other pheno- 

 mena, and prematurely made the basis of general theories. 

 Old theories oppose, with the power of inertia, the acknow- 

 ledgment of inconvenient facts or arguments ; and it is often 

 that some false theory seizes the masses after it has been com- 

 pletely refuted : hence the extreme errors between which 

 knowledge in its progress frequently seems to oscillate. 



The motives for the development of knowledge lie rarely 



