CHAP. XXVII.] JUDGES CASHIERED. 101 



settle on some fixed periods for revising the constitution, and in 

 quiring whether any organic changes were indispensable. 



Among other violent proceedings, I found that the late conven 

 tion had cashiered all the judges of the Supreme Court, although 

 they had been appointed for life, or &quot; quamdiu se bene gesserint,&quot; 

 and with very high salaries. They were to have no retiring 

 pensions, and this I remarked was an iniquity, as some of them 

 had doubtless given up a lucrative practice on the faith of enjoy 

 ing a seat on the bench for life. Some lawyers agreed that the 

 measure was indefensible, and said they presumed that, in the 

 end, the democratic party would elect all the judges annually, by 

 universal suffrage. I met, however, with optimists who were 

 ready to defend every act of the convention. Several of the 

 judges, they said, were superannuated, and it would have been 

 invidious to single them out, and force them to resign. It was 

 better to dismiss the whole. &quot; As for retiring pensions, we hold, 

 with your Jeremy Bentham, that no man can acquire a vested 

 right in a public injury. Men are apt, when they have retained 

 possession of an office for a great part of their lives, to think they 

 own it.&quot; &quot; But what is to become of the judges,&quot; said I, &quot; who 



are thus cast off without pensions ?&quot; &quot; Old Judge A ,&quot; he 



replied, &quot; owns a plantation, and will go and farm it. Judge 



B will probably get a professor s chair in the new Law 



University ;&quot; and so he went on, providing for all of them. &quot; In 

 future,&quot; he continued, &quot; our judges are to be appointed by the 

 Governor and Senate, with good salaries, for eight years ; those 

 first named being for two, four, six, and eight years, so that they 

 may go out in rotation ; but members of the Legislature can not 

 be raised to the bench, as in Great Britain.&quot; I objected, that 

 such a system might render a judge who desired to be re-elected 

 subservient to the party in power, or at least open to such an im 

 putation. &quot; No doubt,&quot; he rejoined ; &quot; as in the case of your 

 judges, who may be promoted to higher posts on the bench. As 

 to the corrupting influence of their dependence on a legislature 

 chosen by a widely-extended suffrage, many of your mayors and 

 aldermen are elected for short terms, and exercise judicial func 

 tions in England.&quot; 



