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ANNALS NEW YORK ACADEMY OF SCIENCES 
force there is in Paley’s argument for direct creation illustrated by the as¬ 
semblage of the parts of a watch so as to produce a timekeeper, is also to be 
found in the Lamarckian conception of animal organs so shaped and united 
as to meet inevitably and always an immediate purpose. It is, therefore, no 
wonder that Lamarck fell back on supernatural intervention and direction 
in the various steps of animal evolution. Darwin never denied the existence 
of a creator, but he was totally unable to grasp the conception of interference 
in the successive stages of evolution, and the idea that nature’s operations 
were in any sense foreordained to the production of organs de novo as and 
when needed to meet the emergencies of life was absolutely foreign to his 
whole habit of thought. The Lamarckian notion is that nature’s laboratory 
turns out parts of animals (like the wheels of the Paleyian watch) simply 
and solely to meet demands (to fill orders, as it were) and is idle when the 
market is dull; the Darwinian conception, on the other hand, is that the 
productive energy of the universe is never still but is manufacturing models 
of infinite variety ready for any requirement that may arise, so that the 
species finally established in the world are results of choices made from the 
endless stock of diverse forms always available. Darwin frankly admitted 
that nature’s policy, as he conceived it, was frightfully wasteful, since it 
called for the constant destruction of forms not needed and a continual 
production of others not likely to be wanted; but, notwithstanding a preva¬ 
lent and pious desire to believe that nature’s methods are more in accordance 
with the dictates of human wisdom and prudence, Darwin convinced the 
world that extravagance in the expenditure of living forms is a matter of 
undeniable proof. In fact, it became one of the chief aims of his philosophy 
to demolish what he regarded as a baseless and outgrown dogma, that 
everything in the world has a recognizably useful purpose. Lamarck’s 
second law, embodying as it does at least a suggestion of this dogma, was 
repugnant to Darwin, and his lack of sympathy with it was the main reason 
why he contemptuously repudiated any indebtedness to Lamarck’s writings. 
I am aware that Kolliker and others charged Darwin himself with being a 
teleologist, but I think that Huxley ably and effectually disposed of that 
accusation and that he was right in saying that, in natural history, teleology 
received its death-blow at Darwin’s hands. Darwin declared, on his own 
behalf, that if every detail of structure could be shown to have been pro¬ 
duced for the good of its possessor, or that structures had been created for 
beauty in the eyes of man, or for mere variety, it would be absolutely fatal 
to his theory. On this general subject Professor Huxley has made the 
acute remark: 
According to Teleology, each organism is like a rifle bullet fired straight at a 
mark; according to Darwin, organisms are like grape shot of which one hits some- 
