Lucretius. 2 1 1 



In short, Lucretius got clearly to the existence of 

 atoms and their permanence, he got clearly to forces 

 agitating them, but he lost a great deal of his clearness in 

 seeking a variety of atoms, and he had no distinct idea of 

 any force. There is much confusion in speaking of the 

 movements, and much contradiction even as to that great 

 one, the inclination to fall, which he sees in an obscure way, 

 and has no desire to seek a cause for. 



It is somewhat unfortunate that in modern times we 

 prefer the same confusion as to the prhnordia reritniy and 

 think that when we have endued them with all power we 

 have explained their action. We have then only arrived 

 at the facts to be explained, and think we have done because 

 we throw the difficulty aside. We might very properly call 

 the unchangeable atom the Daltonian, since neither New- 

 ton nor Lucretius defined its work, and Dalton has made 

 most use of it in science, forming not only a theory, but 

 showing a law and an eternal one. There are, however, at- 

 tempts to find in what manner this atom was made. Dalton 

 had not this difficulty because he quietly gave it attraction, 

 repulsion, heat, and elasticity and conducting forces, and 

 was ready to add anything necessary to make it move. 

 In doing this there is a manifest imperfection, because it 

 makes the atom a compound when it is also supposed to 

 be simple ; character is given, with organs to keep up the 

 character, and, indeed, the characters revolve about the 

 atom, doing all the work and leaving the atom useless. 

 A similar gift of complex characteristics belongs also to the 

 Lucretian and earlier view, and seeing this defect of 

 reasoning Boscovich was led to push the atom out of his 

 scheme of creation and be satisfied with centres of force. 



The view that comes next to this, in reason if not in 



p 2 



