178 SPECTRES OCCASIONED BY DISEASE, 



Narrative and Accordinp; to Fichte, fince during the fituatlon I have above 



remarks on ir-iiT • , r rT ■ , r n r c 



fpeftres pro- oelcribed, 1 was in other relpects in the periett ule ot my 



duced by nervous reafon, as well as the peiTons who were really about me ; as 



1 po 1 ion. ^j^^ apparitions which I faw, as well as thofe which are con- 



fidered as realities, were the one as well as the other, my 



own produdions : — Why then were my creatures of both 



kinds Co eflentially different ? 



My judgment ftiewed me this plainly, by conclulions 

 founded on the previous courfe of obfervations. The greatcfi: 

 modern idealifts who depend fo much on the confufion in 

 which they have involved themfelves by the fuppofed depth 

 of their fpeculations> will certainly never pretend that both 

 perceptions were of the fame nature ; fince if fo, I could 

 not have inveftigated their difference ? But by what means 

 ^ could tfiis be done? I obferved that real perfons followed in a 



determinate order, by external laws that do not depend on 

 me, in an order that I myfelf muff continually follow, as was 

 evident from my fenfe of confcioufnefs, I could alfo lay hold 

 . of the real objeds, as well as of myfelf. Neither of thefe 

 circumftances was, however, the cafe with the phantafms ; 

 I had always found it fo in the conftant obfervation of myfelf, 

 of the apparitions without me, and in my own confcioufnefs. 

 The phantafms, as well as the phenomena, no doubt, lay in 

 my mind ; but I am neceffarily compelled to afcribe to the latter, 

 the feme reality which I am obliged to afcribe to myfelf: viz. 

 fomet'hing that does not lie in my mind alone ; foracthing that 

 alfo exirts without my mind; fomething independent of my 

 confcioufnefs, which determines the nature of my idea ; 

 fomething which we formerly ufed to call the thing itfelf, be- 

 fore the critical philofophy fo unjuftly reprobated this unex- 

 ceptionable term. On the contrary, however, I could not 

 afcribe this fame reality to the illufion ; I could form no other 

 conclufion, than that they originated in my internal confciouf- 

 ^ nefs alone; in a confcioufnefs which was alfo difordered, 

 as I might juftly conclude from the obfervations I made on 

 myfelf. I repeat, that both the phenomena and the phan- 

 tafms exifted in my mind : if I had not been able to diftinguith 

 between them, I muft have been infane. By what means 

 could I diflinguifti, if I did not attribute reality to the 

 former; — and that they poffeffed reality, I inferred from ob- 

 fervations 



