EXPERIMENTS IN GOVERNING CANADA. 259 



In 1867, there was a certain reversion to the Act of 1791, so far 

 as the Canadas are concerned. There was to be a Legislature, one in 

 Toronto and one at Quebec, and though th re are such, but with con- 

 siderably curtailed powers they are with such powers, as Ontario and 

 Quebec desired to have. The praise or blame of confederation, the ex- 

 cellences or defects of the British North America Act of 1867, are to 

 be laid at the charge of these two Provinces. If New Brunswick came 

 in unwillingly, or if Pi-ince Edward Island refused to come in after 

 agreeing to do so, the other Provinces carried the Imperial Act ; and 

 it is not too much to say that if the Act does not follow the agreement 

 of the Provinces signed in Quebec in 1864, the Canadas thought it 

 best to have an Act carried in the best way they could. Looking 

 at this latest charter of government, it is of course a very great 

 departure from any of the charters that preceded it in Canada. A 

 federated monarchy, or a monarchical federation was, except in the 

 United States, a thing unknown to the English speaking people. 

 There was a division in their powers of governing : one set of officers 

 and machinery to do part of the legislative and executive work, and 

 another set and other machinery to do the other part, leaving it for- 

 ever a vexed question as to the exact boundary line between their 

 powers, and their duties. The government of the new Canada was 

 let out so to speak on shares, one Legislature to do the home work 

 for each member of the Union, and the other to do the general 

 £Ovei"nment for all the members. 



The Quebec resolutions set out with considerable diffuseness the 

 different classes of legislative control, but the Act of Union did not 

 exactly sanction that allotment. That may or may not be now a 

 cause for amending the Act — it does not seem to me there is any 

 substantial departure, or if there is that it has worked any great 

 injustice. 



To keep the different legislatures within their own limits was of 

 course a veiy delicate matter to adjust. In the Belgian Union there 

 is no constitutional check, in the United States thei^e is the Supreme 

 Court — all the courts in fact — with us there is as well the veto of the 

 central government. This has become almost a party question, so that 

 it is difficult to say anything of it without seeeming to depart from the 

 pure political aspect of the question. I do not hesitate to say that as 

 a veto must come from some quarter, I prefer to have it come from 



