PBOF. PESKIER ON KNOWING AND BEING. 105 



AN EXAMINATION OF PEOFESSOE FEEEIEE'S 

 THEOET OF KNOWING AND BEING. 



BY THE BET. GEOBGE PAXTON YOUNG, A. M. 



PEOFESSOE OF LOGIC AND METAPHTSIC8, KNOX's COLLEGE, TOEONTO. 



Read before the Canadian Institute, January 2QtJi, 1856. 



In the Institutes of Methaphysic, or Theory of Knowing and Being, 

 by Professor Ferrier of St. Andrews, we have an investigation of the 

 question : What exists ? And the conclusion which the author comes 

 to, is, that "Absolute Existence is the synthesis of subject and ob- 

 ject." In other words, to constitute Absolute (that is, real and in- 

 dependent) Being, two factors are requisite : a conscious subject, 

 and an object apprehended by it. 



The doctrine that Mind is an invariable factor of Being, is, I need 

 not say, altogether opposed to the common view, which attributes to 

 Matter an absolute existence apart from mind. While it is obvious, 

 for example, that the hues of a rainbow do not absolutely exist, but 

 exist only as perceived ; the raindrop which produces the phenomenon 

 by its refraction of the sun' a light, is regarded, not only by the 

 vulgar, but by the majority of philosophers, as a thing of which 

 existence can be affirmed, without taking into view any other thing 

 whatsoever ; a thing which exists as well when no mind is employed 

 about it, as when it is the object of intelligent apprehension, and 

 whose existence would not be a contradiction, even on the supposition 

 of all intelligent minds being annihilated. But to this Professor 

 Ferrier gives a direct denial. No such thing, he holds, as matter 

 any where exists, or can exist, save in synthesis with a mind 

 apprehending it. Matter is merely a contingent factor of existence >' 

 per se it is a contradiction. Our author's theory, however, is no less 

 opposed to the idea tbat Mind has an absolute existence. Even 

 those who hold the view against which Locke argues so strenuously, 

 that the mind always thinks, are for the most part ready to allow 

 that the case might have been otherwise, and that the supposition of 

 there being no object present to the mind — no thing or thought 

 apprehended by it — does not involve a contradiction.- But this is 

 not the opinion of Professor Ferrier. Mind per se, like matter per 

 se, he relentlessly brands as nonsense. Mind according to him, is 

 merely one of the factors necessary to existence : per se it is a 

 contradiction. Existence is constituted by the union of mind (the 

 Ego), a factor which must be invariably present, with objects, which 

 may contingently be either matter (the Non-ego) or states of the Ego 

 — either things (elements contradistinguished from the mind), or 

 thoughts (modifications of the mind.) Let it be particularly observed 



