106 PROF. FEEEIEB ON KNOWING AND BEINO. 



that the doctrine of the Institutes is not that the existing thing 

 called matter is incapable of existing, except as apprehended by the 

 existing thing called mind, and that the existing thing called mind 

 is incapable of existing, except as apprehending an existing object. 

 Matter is not viewed as one existing thing, and mind as another 

 existing thing at all. Mind and its object are considered to be two 

 factors, each of which is indispensable to existence ; and the only 

 things which really and independently exist are Minds-in-union-with- 

 Somewhat. 



It is apparent that this doctrine cannot be established empirically ; 

 for even should all the things whose existence is discovered to us by 

 experience be Minds-in-union-with-Somewhat, it would not follow 

 that these are the only existences possible. Professor Ferrier 

 accordingly disdains the aid of empiricism. Throughout the Institutes 

 he makes not a single appeal, for the purpose of proving the main 

 doctrine of the work, to contingent facts ; but starting from what is 

 regarded as a position of necessary truth, he essays to work out his 

 system by a chain of strictly demonstrative reasoning. 



His conclusions with respect to Being are based upon a peculiar 

 theory of Knowing. His Ontology has an Epistemology for its 

 forerunner; and, as the doctrine of the former is, that what exists 

 is the synthesis of subject and object ; so that of the latter, in which 

 the way is paved for the Ontology.- is, that what is known is the 

 synthesis of subject and object. It will of course be understood, 

 after what is stated in the preceding paragraph, that the Epis- 

 temology of the Institutes is a theory, not of the contingent structure 

 of our cognitions, but of the necessary structure of all cognitions. 

 A subject (self) cannot be known per se by any intelligence ; neither 

 can objects (things or thoughts) be known per se by any intelligence. 

 The object (properly so called) which any intelligence apprehends, 

 is constituted by the union of two factors, the object (popularly so 

 called), and the apprehending mind. The result of the whole inves- 

 tigation may be summed up in a quasi-algebraical formula, which we 

 may call, in Professor Ferrier's own phraseology, "the equation of the 

 "known and the existent." Let Jc be what is known ; and e, what 

 exists; then £=e=self-cum-alio. 



As a condition of the possibility of demonstrating that what any 

 intelligence knows is a synthesis of subject and object, we must at 

 the very outset have a definition of knowledge ; for, from the nature 

 of the case, no necessary conclusions can be established regarding 

 that of which a definition has not been laid down. Should any one 

 say that we are unable to render an account cf what knowledge is, 



