PROF. FERRIER OK KNOWING AND BEING. 109 



Professor Eerrier's argument goes, in maintaining that the Ego ia 

 known, and that the Non-ego, or some state of the Ego, is also known, 

 the two cognitions taking place simultaneously. Perhaps the one 

 position, that the Ego knows itself along with whatever it cognises, 

 does imply the other : that what is known is the synthesis of subject 

 and object ; but the latter cannot be evolved out of the former by a 

 barely logical process ; and the validity of the inference (if it possess 

 validity) can be made apparent only by an exposition of what is 

 meant by the Ego knowing itself in all cognition ; in other words, by 

 a definition of knowledge, not in respect of its object, but in respect 

 of its essential nature. Such a definition requires, in fact, to be 

 given, before we are entitled to speak of an object known at all. Pro- 

 fessor Ferrier appears to have had no qualms of conscience in intro- 

 ducing his readers, at the very beginning of his Institutes, to what 

 he calls the object of cognition — defining cognition by means of its 

 object ; but he ought to have reflected that, until we have determined 

 what cognition itself is, we cannot so much as form an idea of what 

 the words, object of cognition, signify. 



It will be observed that Professor Eerrier's Epistemology beino- a 

 theory of the necessary structure of all knowledge, his answer to the 

 question : "What is kuowledge ? must hold good not only for the cog- 

 nitions of finite minds, but for the divine knowledge likewise. Now 

 even if all the cognitions of finite minds could be supposed to have 

 certain common characteristics, in virtue of which they might be 

 designated by one notion, can it be legitimately taken for granted 

 that there is anything whatsoever in common between knowledge in 

 God, and knowledge in his creatures ? Erom the poverty of lan- 

 guage, we are compelled to use the same term knowledge, to describe 

 the exercise of intelligence by God, which we employ to describe the 

 exercise of our own intelligence ; but that the knowledge of God has 

 anything whatsoever in common with the knowledge of created beings 

 — that there are any necessary laws of cognition to which the divine 

 knowledge, and ours, and that of all other creatures, are alike subject 

 — is certainly not a thing to be lightly assumed. Must not Grod, 

 (Professor Eerrier will ask), know himself in every exercise of his 

 infinite intelligence ? And this is the sole respect in which it is con- 

 tended that knowledge in God and knowledge in us are governed by 

 a common law. (It is difficult to conduct such discussions in a 

 becoming manner ; and there is nothing which I am more anxious to 

 avoid, than the appearance of employing the name of God as though 

 it were an unmeaning symbol. But the point under consideration, 

 and others that will arise before the close of the paper, have so vital 



