110 JROE. FERRIES ON KNOWING AND BEING. 



a connection with the highest moral and religious interests, that it is 

 indispensable to speak in terms which, without sufficient cause, might 

 be open to the charge of irreverent familiarity). Must not God, then 

 know himself— it will be said — along with all that he knows ? Un- 

 doubtedly, in some sense ; but the question that must be determined 

 before this admission can serve Professor Perrier' s purpose, is : In 

 what sense ? If Gfod's knowledge of himself should be altogether 

 of a different kind from our knowledge of ourselves— which I believe 

 it to be— and which at all events, Professor Perrier has not disproved 

 — is it designating the divine knowledge and ours by one notion ; is it 

 reducing them under the dominion of a common law ; is it laying a 

 foundation for a series of propositions applicable to both alike : to tell 

 us that Q-od knows himself in all the acts of his understanding, and 

 that we know ourselves in all the acts of our understanding ? Let it 

 be shewn that the word know means the same thing in both cases, and 

 let its import be pointed out, and then Professor Perrier will be in a 

 position to commence his argument. He will have got a fixed nail on 

 which to hang his chain. 



In the following passage our author replies to the charge of pre- 

 sumption which he anticipates that some will bring against him 

 for endeavoring to reduce all intelligence, whether divine or human, 

 under the dominion of necessary laws. " It may seem to adopt a 

 " somewhat presumptuous line of exposition in undertaking to lay 

 " down the laws, not only of our thinking and knowing, but of all 

 " possible thinking and knowing. This charge is answered simply by 

 £< the remark that it would be still more presumptuous to exclude 

 " any possible thinking, any possible knowing, any possible intel- 

 " ligence, from the operation of these laws — for the laws here refer- 

 " red to are necessary truths — their opposites involve contradictions 

 " and therefore the supposition that any intelligence can be exempt, 

 <( from them is simply nonsense." And with reference to a supposed 

 enquiry on the part of a reader, whether it might not have been suf- 

 ficient to lay down the alleged necessary laws of cognition as ab- 

 solutely authoritative over human intelligence only, he goes on to say • 

 " Grood reader, this is not sufficient. It is absolutely indispensable, 

 " (this must be confessed in the plainest terms) — it is absolutely in- 

 « dispensable for the salvation of our argument, from beginning to 

 " end, that these necessary laws should be fixed as authoritative, not 

 " over human reason only, but as binding on all possible intelligence. 

 " It is not possible, therefore, for the system to adopt any such sug- 

 " gestion as that thrown out. And if the reader had any further 

 " misgivings as to the propriety of our course, we would recommend 



