PBOF. EEBBIEB ON KNOWING AND BEING. HI 



" him to consider whether he does not hold that all reason is bound 

 " by the law of contradiction as expounded in sec. 28. Of course, if 

 " we may assign to intelligence universally any one necessary condi- 

 " tion of thought and knowledge, the whole question is at an end, 

 " and must be held to be decided in favor of the views of this sys- 

 "tern." As this is the only passage in the Institutes where any 

 thing having the semblance of argument is advanced in support of 

 the principle that all intelligence is governed by certain necessary 

 laws, it merits special examination. In the first place when Pro- 

 fessor Terrier affirms that it would be wrong to exclude any possible 

 thinking from the operation of the laws in question, because they are 

 necessary laws, this remark has plainly no force as an argument ; for 

 the yery point in dispute is whether there are any such necessary laws. 

 Again, it is said that the opposites of these laws involve contradic- 

 tions. But how so ? In what way is it a contradiction to hold that 

 knowledge in Grod may be something so entirely different from 

 knowledge in us, that they cannot be designated by any single no- 

 tion ? Let us consider what Professor Perrier means by a contra- 

 diction. He means that which no intelligence can possibly conceive. 

 Matter, for instance, according to him, is a contradiction, it is non- 

 sense, it is an absurdity, because per se it is incapable of being con- 

 ceived by any intelligence. On what grounds then is it asserted that 

 knowledge essentially different from ours — so different as not to ad- 

 mit of being brought under any common law with ours— is a thing 

 inconceivable by any intelligence ? Though it may be inconceivable 

 by us, this will not entitle us to pronounce it inconceivable absolute- 

 ly. But Professor Perrier gives an example in which he thinks it 

 plain that a necessary and universal law of intelligence is expressed • 

 and he argues that if one sucli law can be apprehended by us, others 

 may be so likewise. The example is the law of contradiction — that 

 a thing must be what it is — that A is A. But what a gross fallacy, 

 to cite a logical principle in illustration of a question of Peal Being ! 

 Granting that by no intelligence can the law of contradiction be 

 conceived untrue, what does such a concession amount to ? To 

 this and nothing more— that where a thing is conceived (in any 

 sense of the term), the conception is exactly what it is. But does 

 this in the least degree go to prove that there cannot be knowledge 

 or conception so radically different from ours, that the two do not 

 admit of being designated by any common notion ? " Of course, " 

 says Professor Perrier, " if we assign to intelligence universally any 

 one necessary condition of thought and knowledge, the whole ques- 

 tion is at an end. " Not so, by any means — if a logical principle ia 



