PBOF. TWEETER ON KNOWING AND BEING. 113 



fessor Eerrier has not given this. Of course, he cannot reason upon 

 existence without in reality assuming something about it ; and when 

 we look iuto his argument, so as to discover the notion of existence 

 on which he implicitly proceeds, we find that it is essentiallv the 

 same Avith that of Spiuoza — " per substantias intelligo id quod in 

 " se est, et per se concipitur ; hoc est id, cujus conceptus non indi- 

 "get couceptu alterius rei, a, quo formari debeat." Substance or 

 absolute existence is that which is conceived by itself (the conclu- 

 sions of Spinoza do not at all depend on the clause in se est as dis- 

 tinguished froin j;>er se concipitur), or to the conception of which the 

 conception of nothing else is required. This is precisely the view 

 taken by Professor Ferrier ; though, as I have said, he does not 

 present it in the form of a definition, but gives it as a result of 

 reasoning. The third proposition of his Ontology is, that " Abso- 

 lute Existence, or Being in itself, is not the contradictory ; " that is, 

 it admits of being conceived by some intelligence. Without ex- 

 amining the demonstration which is given of this proposition, it is 

 enough to observe that, as an argument, it cannot but be inconclu- 

 sive, no definition of absolute existence having been furnished, ex- 

 cept what the proposition itself affords. So long as absolute exist- 

 ence has not been defined, we can no more prove that it is not the 

 contradictory, than we can prove that the rclplum scalclath of Gruli- 

 ver's philosopher is not the contradictory. 



The fact is, that even in the way of definition, it is not legitimate 

 to describe Absolute Existence or Real Being as that which may be 

 conceived per se. It may perhaps be thought that a writer is at 

 liberty to define terms as he pleases ; but the definition in question 

 — which contains the germ of all Spinoza's hideous conclusions — 

 cannot be allowed ; because if it does not covertly beg the whole 

 question in dispute, it is without meaning. When it is said that 

 Eeal Being is that which may be conceived per se, what, I ask, is 

 it for a thing to be conceived ? The term conception is used either 

 as descriptive of our thinking specially, or in some wider sense. If 

 it be employed in the former way then, in defining Eeal Being as 

 that which can be conceived by itself, it is denied that any thing ex- 

 ists beyond the possible grasp of our apprehension— a doctrine 

 which cannot be allowed to creep in surreptitiously under the guise 

 of a definition. But if the term be taken in the latter sense, then 

 the statement that Eeal Being is not the Contradictory or the Ab- 

 solutely Inconceivable, is one to which I can affix no meaning. I 

 understand what is meant by a thing being the inconceivable to me, 

 but not what is meant by its being the inconceivable absolutely. 



