118 PROF. FEREZEB. OK KNOWING AND BEIWG. 



the words, an unthinking, inactive substance cannot be the cause, or 

 occasion, or instrument, of our perceptions. Should it finally be urged 

 that perhaps matter, an unthinking, inactive something, of which 

 we have no positive idea whatever, exists without the mind : Berkeley 

 replies (and here the weak point of bis Ontology becomes apparent) 

 that in affirming that matter may exist, while at the same time we 

 acknowledge that we attach no positive idea to the term, we mean 

 nothing. I quote the following passage from the 2nd dialogue be- 

 tween Hylas and Pbilonous. Phil. — " Can any more be required to 

 " prove the absolute impossibility of a thing, than the proving it im- 

 " possible in every particular sense that either you or any one else 

 u understands it in ? " Ryl. — " But I am not so thoroughly satis- 

 " fied that you have proved the impossibility of matter in the last 

 " most obscure, abstracted and indefinite sense." Phil. — ""When is 

 « a thing sbown to be impossible ? " Hyl. — " When a repugnancy 

 " is demonstrated between the ideas comprehended in its definition."' 

 " Phil. — " But where there are no ideas, there no repugnancy can be 

 iC demonstrated between ideas?" Hyl* — "I agree with you."" 

 " Phil. — " Now in that which you call the obscure indefinite sense 

 " of the word matter, it is plain by your own confession, there was 

 " included no idea at all, no sense except an unknown sense, which 

 " is the same thing as none. You are not therefore to expect 1 

 " should prove a repugnancy between ideas, where there are no 

 " ideas, or the impossibility of matter taken in an unknown sense;, 

 " that is, no sense at all. My business was only to shew that you 

 " meant nothing, and this you were brought to own. So that in all 

 " your various senses you have been shewed either to mean nothing 

 " at all, or if any thing an absurdity. And if this be not sufficient 

 " to prove the impossibility of a thing, I desire you will let me know 

 " what is. " Eyl.— U I acknowledge you have proved that matter is 

 " impossible; nor do I see what more can be said in reference to it." 

 Now, in my judgment, Hylas was a fool to give up his case in this 

 fashion. The impossibility of a substance different from spirit, is 

 not proved, by proving its impossibility under any particular notion 

 of it that we can form. But, says Berkeley, in affirming the possi- 

 bility of matter, in some xmknown sense of the word, you mean 

 nothing. "Well, what then ? "We may not be able, attaching any 

 positive meaning to our words, to assert the possibility of an ex- 

 istence distinct from spirits ; but this does not imply that such an 

 existence is impossible. Existence may not be limited to what we 

 are capable of conceiving. " "Where there are no ideas there no re- 

 " pugnancy can be demonstrated between ideas. " Most true. Con- 



