120 PEOF. FERRIER ON KNOAVING AND BEING. 



What, then, is perception? It is a relation of a certain kind 

 between the Ego and the Non-ego : in other words, it is the Ego and 

 the Non-ego standing related to one another. Perception is not 

 different from sensation ; but a sensation, and the perception usually 

 spoken of as acompanying it, are the same relation — the same indi- 

 visible consciousness — differently denominated. When Ave wish to 

 designate the relation, so as especially to affirm the existence of one 

 of the correlative terms, the Ego, we call it sensation ; and when we 

 wish to designate it so as specially to affirm the existence of the 

 other of its correlative terms ; the Non-ego, we call it perception. 

 Whether correct or not, this answer to the proposed question is at 

 at all events to the purpose : for, to ask what knowledge is, is 

 equivalent to asking what is the common characteristic of all know- 

 ledge. Now, our perceptions or sensitive cognitions, in their 

 manifold diversity, have this in common — that each of them is a rela- 

 tion between the Ego and the Non-ego. I do not here, like Professor 

 Ferrier, represent a variety of cognitions as having something com- 

 mon in their objects ; but I designate the cognitions themselves by 

 one notion. Take any act of sensitive consciousness that you please, 

 it (the cognition) is a relation between the Ego and the Non-ego. In 

 the case, for example, when (to speak popularly) one is looking at a 

 red object, the knowledge realised is that particular relation between 

 the Ego and the Non-ego which we describe by saying that a red 

 object is perceived, or that a sensation of redness is experienced. 



Having defined pereeption, we are in a position now to speak of 

 the object of perception, and to determine whether the object which 

 we at any time perceive be a synthesis of the Ego and the Non-ego. 

 In sensitive consciousness, the Ego and the Non-ego are apprehended 

 together, both terms being necessary to the relation in which sensi- 

 tive consciousness consists. The Ego is manifested to itself — not 

 absolutely, but in its relation to the Non-ego ; and at the same time, 

 the Non-ego is manifested to the Ego — not absolutely, but in relation 

 to the Ego. Such being the case, shall Ave say with Professor Eerrier 

 that the sole object (properly so called) of perception, is a synthesis 

 of Self and Not-self ? or shall we say that the two objects, Self and 

 Not-self, are cognized simultaneously ? Which alternative must we 

 choose ? We may adopt either, by giving a proper definition to the 

 word object. Object, in a case of sensitive perception, might be 

 defined as that term in the relation constituting the perception, 

 which stands in correlation to the Ego or subject ; or, more fully, 

 both terms, the Ego as well as the Non-ego, might be called objects 

 known — the former a subjective, and the latter an objective, object. 



