PROF. EERRIER ON KNOWING AND BEING. 121 



But if such a definition were laid down, it would require to be kept 

 in view that there are not two separate cognitions corresponding to 

 the objects thus discriminated. It would be incorrect to say that in 

 one cognition, the Non-ego is the object known; and that in another 

 distinct (though simultaneous) cognition, the Ego is the object 

 known : for the apprehension of the Non-ego by the Ego and of the 

 Ego by itself, is a single indivisible act of consciousness ; the relation 

 betwixt the Ego and the Non-ego, having two terms indeed, but not 

 being thereby rendered plural in its character as a relation. On the 

 other hand, object might be defined in such a way as not to differ, 

 except logically, from act. In this case, as the act of perceiving is 

 nothing else than the Ego in a certain relation to the Non-ego, so the 

 object perceived would be the Ego in a certain relation to the 

 Non-ego ; which may be not inappropriately expressed by saying that 

 the object of perception is a synthesis, in which the Ego is an inva- 

 riable, and the Non-ego a variable, factor. In this sense, Professor 

 Eerrier's doctrine : that which is perceived is the synthesis of subject 

 and object, may be admitted. Only let there be no misunderstand- 

 ing as to what the admission involves. It simply means — what 

 might have been also conveyed by the more common phraseology 

 which recognizes the Ego and the Non-ego as two separate objects — - 

 that a relation is constituted between the Ego and the Non-ego — a 

 single indivisible relation — whose character is partly due to the one 

 factor (the Ego), and partly due to the other factor (the Non-ego). 



By subscribing, in the sense indicated, to the doctrine of Professor 

 Eerrier, that the object of perception is always a synthesis of the 

 Ego and of the Non-ego, does it become necessary to go along with 

 him in inferring that absolute (real and independent) existence can- 

 not be predicted either of the Ego per se, or of the Non-ego per se, but 

 only of the Ego in synthesis with the Non-ego ? The answer which 

 must be given to this question depends altogether upon the idea at- 

 tached to the word absolute, which qualifies existence. 



If absolute be the opposite of relative, then, according to the views 

 above presented, there is no evidence warranting us to attribute 

 absolute existence either to the Ego or the Non-ego ? Is the Ego 

 ever known to exist out of relation to the Non-ego? Do we ever 

 catch ourselves (to use Hume's expression) without a perception ? 

 Never. Is the Non-ego ever known to exist out of relation to tho 

 Ego ? On the contrary, the very knowledge of it which we realize, 

 consists in a relation betwixt the Ego and the Non-ego. As regarda 

 the Ego, the question under consideration is the same with that 

 which Locko discussed so unsatisfactorily : "Whether tho mind 



