PEOF. FEEBLER ON KNOWING AND BEING. 123 



tive (not independent) existence of Self; and each sets forth at the 

 same time the relative (not independent) existence of Not-self. The 

 two equally describe a relation, which, whether you call it X-in- 

 relation-to-T or Y-in-relation-to-X, is still the same relation. 



It has perhaps been made sufficiently plain in the course of the pre- 

 ceding remarks, yet to prevent mistake I may repeat, that the exis- 

 tence, whether of the Ego or of the Non-ego, must not be presumed to 

 be dependent upon the maintenance of such relations as those in which 

 we at any time know them to exist. Though we have no evidence, for 

 example, to shew that our minds ever exist out of relation to matter, 

 it is not therefore demonstrated that a relation between mind and 

 matter is indispensable to the existence of the former. This would 

 follow, (little as Berkeley was aware of it,) if his principle, that a 

 thing must be held to be impossible, when it has been proved so in 

 every sense which we can conceive, were valid : for it is past doubt, 

 that, never having been conscious of any existence which did not im- 

 ply a relation betwixt the Ego and the Non-ego, we can form no con- 

 ception of the existence of an Ego per se. But the principle is a bad 

 one. Possible existence must not be limited to what we are capable 

 of conceiving. In like manner, though we have no evidence to sheAV 

 that matter ever exists out of relation to mind (Berkeley was right 

 so far) it does not follow that its existence out of relation to mind is 

 an impossibility. This was Berkeley's great fallacy. True ; we can 

 form no conception of matter perse: but possible existence must not 

 be limited to what we can conceive. 



As I have followed Professor Eerrier in using as interchangeable 

 the expressions, absolute, and independent existence ; it is necessary 

 to remark that, in the above reasonings, it is not implied that the 

 finite existence which manifests itself in sensitive perception, is 

 independent, so as to have the principle of its being in itself : the idea 

 naturally suggested, and indeed intended to be conveyed, by Spinoza's 

 definition, "per substantiam intelligo id quod in se est, &c." All 

 that has been shewn, is, that there is no evidence for the existence of 

 the Ego independently of, or out of relation to, the Non-ego ; and that 

 there is no evidence for the existence of the Non-ego independently of 

 or out of relation to. the Ego. Even therefore if, in Professor Fer- 

 rier's phraseology, this should be stated by saying that what exists is 

 a synthesis of the Ego and the Non-ego, it would be gratuitous and, 

 I have no hesitation in adding, false, to affirm that the synthesis thus 

 recognised as existing, has the principle of its Being in itself, or, in 

 other words, is, independently of a continued exercise of sustaining 

 power on the part of the infinite Creator. There is nothiug in phil- 



