BEYIEWS THE TALIDITX OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 381 



falsehood of which they are therefore responsible, are mutually repugnant. By 

 evincing either of these, the veracity of consciousness will be disproved." 



"No attempt," it is subsequently remarked, '' to shew that the data of consci- 

 ousness are (either in themselves or in their necessary consequences) mutually 

 contradictory, has yet succeeded ; and the presumption in favor of the truth of 

 consciousness and the possibility of philosophy has, therefore, never been redar- 

 gued." 



Now these statements seem to us to open the door to scepticism. 

 For what do they imply ? Obviously, that though a denial of the 

 primary data of consciousness involves what is abhorrent to our nat- 

 ural sentiments, and not to be thought of, except under the pressure 

 of a logical necessity, yet there are at least conceivable circumstan- 

 ces in which such a denial would be warrantable. Sir "William's 

 doctrine renders it obligatory upon us to hear the pleadings of coun- 

 sel against consciousness, if any person should come forward, and 

 make affidavit that he can show consciousness to be self-contradictory. 

 But if we can be required, under any pretence whatever, to listen to 

 evidence against our primary beliefs, they cannot be absolutely, in- 

 fallibly, in the strictest sense of the term, certain. Observe the 

 language in which Sir William himself expresses the conclusion that 

 satisfies his mind, and in which he wishes his readers to rest. It is 

 exceedingly (we had almost said •painfully) significant. " No attempt 

 to shew that the data of consciousness are (either in themselves or 

 in their necessary consequences) mutually contradictory, has yet 

 succeeded; and the presumption in favor of the truth of conscious- 

 ness and the probability of philosophy has, therefore, never been red- 

 argued." The presumption in favor of the truth of consciousness ! 

 And has it come to this ? A presumption ! To silence scepticism 

 and render philosophy possible, we must have something more than 

 a presumption — Ave must have an absolute certainty — of the truth of 

 consciousness. 



In most unfortunate consistency with the adinission that it is 

 " competent to lead a proof that they (the primary convictions of 

 consciousness) are undeserving of credit," Sir William Hamilton 

 assigns a reason for trusting the deliverances of consciousness. To 

 doubt them would be to suppose that the root of our nature is a lie. 

 Well : a sceptic might rejoin ; what then ? Be it so. It may be 

 urged that our conceptions of the great Creator forbid us to enter- 

 tain the thought. God cannot be a deceiver. Is then, we ask, our 

 conviction of the trustworthiness of consciousness dependent on, or 

 capable of deriving support from, the conceptions which we form of 

 the Divine Being? No. The sole guarantee which, in the I; st anal- 



