382 reviews— tiii; validity of consciousness. 



ysis, we have for the validity of the conceptions which we form of 

 the Divine Being, is consciousness itself. And does not a child, who 

 has no idea of the moral attributes of God, believe the intimations 

 of consciousness as firmly and as warrantably as the most enlighten- 

 ed philosopher ? Even if the argument derived from the veracity of 

 God be intended simply to corroborate the trustworthiness of con- 

 sciousness ; if Sir "William Hamilton mean (as we presume he 

 does) that consciousness certifies us of its own veracity, but that 

 our instinctive persuasion of its truth is fortified by a considera- 

 tion of what would be involved in its being false, viz., that God 

 would be a deceiver ; we are unable to consent to this. We 

 deny that the trustworthiness of consciousness can receive the 

 slightest corroboration from reasoning. A condition of the possibi- 

 lity of any thing being corroborated by argument, is, that it can be 

 argued about. But in no intelligible sense (as wc shall presently en- 

 deavor to shew in a particular case) can the veracity of consciousness 

 be even proposal as a question for delate. 



Sir William accepts the deliverances of consciousness " in the first 

 instance." He accepts them, however, with this concession to the 

 sceptic, that, if they should at any time be shewn to be, either in 

 themselves or in their necessary consequences, contradictory, he will 

 give up his faith in them. Now, on the part of consciousness, we 

 protest against any such concession being made to scepticism. Con- 

 sciousness is injured when we subscribe to its veracity with an if. 

 "Your if," said Shakspeare, " is a great peace-maker." At times, 

 it is something more. In the case before us it is a traitor who lets 

 the enemy into the fortress. To say that we will regard a man as 

 truthful until he be detected in a falsehood, is virtually admitting 

 that, (much as it would be to our surprise and disappointment), he 

 may be guilty of uttering a lie. The principle that consciousness is 

 nfallible, is not indeed expressly gainsaid — on the contrary, it is in 

 terms affirmed — by Sir "William Hamilton. But that great principle, 

 the recognition of which — as Sir William himself declares — alone 

 renders philosophy possible, is, in our opinion, compromised by his 

 mode of treating the subject. We have an instinctive feeling, he con- 

 tends, that our primary cognitions are valid. A\ r e must begin by ac- 

 cepting them as valid ; for otherwise we could not reason at all. It is 

 certainly competent for a sceptic to lead proof to establish the contra- 

 ry ; but no sceptic has ever yet succeeded in such an attempt. Komorn 

 has hitherto maintained, against all assaults, its character of impreg- 

 nability. This is a comfortable confirmation of our first and natural 

 impressions. The original presumption in favor of consciousness is 



