REVIEWS — THE VALIDITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS. 385 



true. It is only by setting out with this presumption that know- 

 ledge is possible. And as it has never yet been shewn that this 

 presumption leads to results contradictory of one another, it follows 

 that "as philosophy now stands," the declarations of consciousness 

 are " entitled to demand prompt and unconditional assent." "We 

 are, of course, simply repeating what has been already said, when we 

 charge this doctrine with opening a door to scepticism. Our faith 

 in the existence of a Non-ego is nothing better than a " presump- 

 tion ;" a strong presumption, perhaps ; but still only a presumption. 

 We have faith in the Non-ego; but not a knowledge of it, in the 

 proper sense of the term. It is within the bounds of possibility, 

 that in 'presuming the Non-ego to exist, Ave are mistaken. Is Sir 

 William Hamilton — the Apostle of Natural Eealism — the St. George 

 of Philosophy, Avhose spear has been thought to have given the death 

 wound to that Dragon of Scepticism which so many valiant knights 

 have assailed in vain — is he himself, after all, chargeable with holding 

 sentiments essentially sceptical ? 



The distinction to which Sir William Hamilton attaches so much 

 importance, would not remove our objections even if it were admit- 

 ted; but we are unable to persuade ourselves that it has any foundation. 

 In an act of sensitive perception (it is said) we are conscious of self, 

 the subject knowing ; and of something different from self, the ob- 

 ject known. Now, let it be understood, that, though a two-fold ob- 

 ject may be discriminated in an act of sensitive consciousness, the 

 act itself, the consciousness, is not two-fold, but is single and indivi- 

 sible. By one indivisible act of consciousness, the Ego and the Non- 

 ego are apprehended in their mutual relation. The Ego is appre- 

 hended, not absolutely, but in its relation to the Non-ego : the Non- 

 ego is apprehended, not absolutely, but in its relation to the Ego — 

 the latter apprehension not being a distinct cognitive act from the 

 former, but being identical with it. With this explanation, let us 

 proceed. Our consciousness of the Non-ego, Sir William Hamilton 

 tells us, may be viewed in two aspects; first, the consciousness real- 

 ized may be considered as a phenomenon — in this aspect, doubt re- 

 garding it would be suicidal by self-contradiction: secondly, it may 

 be viewed as a testimony to the existence of the Non-ego — in this 

 aspect doubl is not peremptorily repelled. But are these aspects, 

 we ask, in reality different? We maintain that they are not. Let 

 us not be led, by mere diversities of expression, to fancy that there 

 are real diversities, where none exist. Is it not a contradiction to 

 speak of two different aspects of consciousness ? What is the as- 



