190 MILITA R Y OPERA TIONS IN SO UTH A FRICA 



The Boer Republics form an irregular oval. The major axis, nearly 

 parallel to the coast line of the Indian Ocean, is ahont 440 miles, and 

 its minor axis, rei)resented by a straight line from Mafeking to the 

 apex of Natal, is about 290 miles. The eastern frontier of the South 

 African Republic abuts on Portuguese territor3^ With this excep- 

 tion, the Boer Republics are entirely surrounded by British coUinies. 



MILITARY Ol'ERATlONS IN NATAL 



The geographical situation of Natal peculiarly favors the Boers. 

 The northern part forms almost an equilateral triangle. The north- 

 western side is the Orange Free State boundarj^ the nortli eastern that 

 of the South African Rei)ublic. In anticipation of war the various 

 Boer commanders had assembled at various convenient points along 

 the frontier, and, the morning after their ultimatum ex})ired, made 

 their entry in several different columns into British territory. To 

 prevent the cutting off of the British forces in northern Natal and to 

 effect a concentration at Ladysmith, the British were obliged to at- 

 tack the Boers, who. on the offensive strategical!}', were on the de- 

 fensive tactically, with great advantage to themselves. The actions 

 of Glencoe, Elandslaagte, and Rietfontein were fought, and the net 

 result of this series of movements was the cutting off of Sir George 

 White's army and the investment of Ijadysmith. The selection of 

 this place was probably made as it is a railway junction and large 

 quantities of supplies had been collected there. From a military 

 point of view, it had little else to recommend it. Though at an alti- 

 tude of about .').oOO feet, it lies relatively in a basin, being commanded 

 b}' higher ground on all sides, notablj'- by Lombard's Kop, a little 

 north of east, and Isimbulwana to the southeast, lioth within range 

 of tlie guns mounted there by the Boers. 



Tiie subsequent operations in Natal due to Buller's advance to the 

 relief of Lad3^smith were also greatl}' influenced by the topographical 

 features. The line of advance Avas, under the conditions existing, 

 necessaril}' restricted to the railroad running north to Ladysmith. 

 None knew this better than the Boers, and they took full advantage 

 of their knowledge. Good defensive positions abounded, and they 

 could be prepared in advance. If the Boers were driven back from 

 one, after inflicting much greater loss than they themselves suffered, 

 they had another good position a little in the rear. When S|>ion 

 Kop was taken by the British after hard fighting, it Avas thought by 

 the officer in command on the ground untenable on account of the 



