THE TAJIN TOTONAC PART 1 KELLY AND PALERM 



29 



served as advance guard for the cavalry, so that 

 "the horses might not be endangered" (Solis, p. 

 124) . As a matter of fact, one gains the impres- 

 sion that Cortes trusted the Totonac (Gayangos, 

 p. 60) more than his recently acquired allies, the 

 Tlaxcalans, for when the Spaniards retired to their 

 quarters, they were accompanied only by "Cem- 

 poaltecas" (Solis, p. 125). Just before entering 

 the Mexican capital, a number of Totonac re- 

 quested permission to return to their homes, and 

 Cortes assented. However, both Totonac and 

 Tlaxcalans were in the ranks when the army en- 

 tered Tenochtitlan (Sahagun 4: 60; Solis, p. 133). 



TOTONACAPAN AFTER THE MARCH OF CORTES 



While Cortes and his army were proceeding to- 

 ward Tenochtitlan, Escalante, and the small force 

 which had been left behind, faced a difficult situa- 

 tion. The Mexican garrison in Nautla 63 began to 

 overrun the country, and the Totonac leaders com- 

 plained to Escalante, reminding him of promised 

 aid. The Spaniards were scarcely in condition to 

 be helpful because, apart from their limited num- 

 bers, most of them were either ill or aged. Re- 

 gardless, assistance was indicated, to avoid losing 

 prestige and to avoid having later to face not only 

 Mexican but Totonac ire. 



Escalante attempted to resolve the problem dip- 

 lomatically, by sending "Cempoalteca" envoys to 

 Cuauhpopoca, the Mexican leader in Nautla. The 

 response was bold and discourteous (Solis, p. 163). 

 Accordingly, the Spanish captain mustered some 

 40 of his most fit soldiers, and with 2,000 Totonac 

 troops (Diaz del Castillo 1 : 344)— or, 6,000 (Epis- 

 tolario 1:76), according to one of the partici- 

 pants — he sallied forth against the Mexicans. The 

 encounter took place on the plains of "Almeria" 

 (Nautla), and the result was indecisive. Scarcely 

 had the battle started when the Totonac deserted 

 the field. Nevertheless, Escalante managed to 

 enter Nautla and to burn the houses. Although 

 the Mexicans officially were vanquished, seven 

 Spaniards were killed, among them Escalante, and 

 another was captured alive and his head sent as a 

 trophy to Moctezuma. 



In spite of the fact that the battle was generally 

 presented as a Spanish victory, letters which 



reached Mexico from Veracruz depicted a desper- 

 ate situation. 54 Cortes acted rapidly and effec- 

 tively, by forcing the imprisoned Moctezuma to 

 have Cuauhpopoca tortured. Totonacapan again 

 was reduced to obedience. Cortes sent Alonso de 

 Grado to take charge of the garrison, replacing 

 him almost at once by Gonzalo de Sandoval, who 

 completed the subjugation of the area. While 

 Cortes, keeping Moctezuma prisoner, was sending 

 explorers to different parts of the Mexican realm, 

 we may imagine that Veracruz garrison was not 

 inactive, especially when in charge of a leader with 

 the qualities of Gonzalo de Sandoval. But there 

 is no record, at that time, of further campaigns 

 in Totonacapan. 



KARVAEZ, AND THE RETURN OF CORTES 



As a matter of fact, Gonzalo de Sandoval had 

 little time at his disposal before the appearance of 

 the fleet sent by Diego Velazquez, with troops 

 under the command of Panfilo de Narvaez. The 

 infuriated Governor of Cuba was eager, at all costs, 

 to subdue Cortes. 



The forces of Narvaez camped in "Cempoala," 

 and lost no time in arousing the hatred of the 

 Totonac. The chief of "Cempoala" had received 

 the group with joy, believing that reinforcements 

 had come for Cortes and expecting, moreover, the 

 treatment warranted by virtue of the Totonac 

 position as allies and Spanish subjects. But his 

 disillusionment was rapid and complete. Not only 

 did Narvaez incite Moctezuma against Cortes, but 

 he exploited and mistreated the Totonac. He per- 

 sonally despoiled the "Cempoalteca" chief of his 

 treasures and obliged him to surrender Spanish 

 property left in his custody. The subordinates of 

 Narvaez followed the example set by their leader. 



The activities of Narvaez not only encouraged 

 the Mexicans to rise against Cortes, but they like- 

 wise threatened to provoke a Totonac revolt. The 

 day was saved in Totonacapan by the rapid march 

 of Cortes from Tenochtitlan to "Cempoala" and 

 by his brilliant defeat of Narvaez; not so in the 

 Mexican capital where, provoked by Pedro de 

 Alvarado, a general uprising took place. 



"Diaz del Castillo (1:343) places it "a la raya do Pfmueo, 

 entre Tuzap&n y un pueblo que le pusimos por nombre Almeria" — 

 that is, Nautla. 



51 ". . . quo todos los pueblos de la sierra y Cempoal y su sujeto 

 estan alterados y no les quicren dar comida ni servir eu la for- 

 talcza, y que no saben qufi so hacer, y que como de antes los 

 tenfan por teules, que abora que ban visto aquel desbarate les 

 bacon fleros, a.sf los totonaques como los mexicanos, y que no les 

 tienen en nada nl saben que remedio tomar . . ." (Diaz del 

 Castillo 1 : 342). 



