2 THE CABINET OF NATURAL HISTORY, 
The writer of Natural History should be guided by 
truth in all of his descriptions, carefully avoiding every 
thing to which he was not an eye-witness, or that cannot 
be established by the most indubitable testimony; and 
leave nothing to fancy, or the workings of an enthu- 
siastic imagination. It is only by the impress of truth, 
that the mind receives essential benefit, and the more 
perfect mankind become in the knowledge of animals of 
the inferior world, the better are they enabled to appre- 
ciate their own exalted being. 
There is much to admire, not only in the Beaver, but 
in all other inferior animals; but our admiration should 
not be extended to the creature so much, as to the great 
Original who governs them in their actions in a sphere 
far above their consciousness. 
Although the Beaver exhibits much sagacity, and cer- 
tainly immense labour and perseverance, in the construc- 
tion of dams and habitations, and forethought for winter 
provision,—yet we see the same power operating on 
many other animals, on a scale equal, if not superior. 
What do we see more to admire than the nidification of 
birds? This instinctive provision for their young, is ac- 
commodated by the parent birds to every place and cir- 
cumstance, and, built of the most simple materials, their 
little nests defy the art of man to imitate them. 
“ 
Mark it well; within, without: 
No tool had they that wrought, no knife to cut, 
No nail to fix, no bodkin to insert, 
No glue to join; their little beaks were all ; 
And yet how neatly finished. What nice hands, 
And twenty years’ apprenticeship to boot, 
Could make me such another ?” 
The wonderful mechanism of the spider’s web,—the 
wariness and certainty which that insect displays in en- 
trapping its victim,—and the wholeeconomy of the honey- 
bee, have been regarded as so many wonders of the natu- 
ral world. But are all these guided by any other power 
than that of pure instinct? Certainly not, as regards 
their consciousness. 
In regard to the nature of instinct, it may be said, that 
the mind is too often led astray by wrong objects—or by 
forming a wrong basis for argument. For instance, we 
sometimes see a departure from the regular laws of instinct 
in animals around us,—as in the elephant, the horse, the 
dog, &e. In these are frequently exhibited apparent sa- 
gacity, memory, discernment, and other reasonable ope- 
rations. But before we conclude from this, that the brute 
creation possess intellectual properties, we should inquire, 
what effect has the influence of man, or domestication, on 
them from which we would found our argument? It is 
to these, and other animals of like domestication, that 
recourse is always had, to prove the brute world possesses 
reason as well as instinct. Those animals, therefore, sub- 
ject to domestication, are not proper objects from which 
to draw that conclusion; for it is evident, that these were 
originally intended for purposes connected with the 
comforts and welfare of mankind,—and the formation of 
their instinctive powers are such, as to be subject to his 
influence and guidance. Indeed, we see a wonderful in- 
fluence exerted by human presence on all nature; and, as 
we are told in sacred writ, that God hath placed in 
all beasts the fear of man, it is reasonable to conclude, 
that the intelligence of the human species, imparted in a 
measure by association to the sagacity of those animals, 
often produces effects on them, which lead to results aston- 
ishing and wonderful. 
Aside from these animals, over which man has exercised 
his influence, we behold all others governed by laws of 
necessity, which impel them in their course of operations, 
only to answer the end for which they were originally de- 
signed in a state of nature. The same potent energy 
which created, also guides them in those wonderful 
plans of necessity which we so much admire; and, al- 
though they are thus influenced and directed by a supe- 
rior intelligent power, they have no consciousness of 
this exciting energy, nor can they appreciate the result 
of their labours, or value the interest attached to their ac- 
tions. 
Under this view, then, it may be said, that brutes only 
belong to the natural world; or, in other words, not pos- 
sessing moral qualities, they do not belong to the moral 
world. ‘They haye no moral freedom of action, although 
they produce results often which would lead us, under a 
wrong view of the subject, to draw a different conclusion. 
Instances may be produced of actions in the dog, more 
moral or perfect, in an abstract sense, than those per- 
formed by human creatures; but we cannot for a moment 
admit that these are efforts of their own consciousness, un- 
less we place them in a scale of moral excellence superior 
to man. But these actions are only apparently moral, as 
regards their conception, and not really so; for these ani- 
mals are not capable of appreciating the excellence of their 
acts, nor to decide of their superiority over those of other 
brutes. Intelligence, moral actions, and science, there- 
fore, are not objective to brutes, but are exercised on their 
natures by a governing power, above their perception or 
consciousness. 
Having made these prefatory remarks, the history of 
the Beaver, in the form of a parallel, will be given, the 
authentic on one side, and the discarded or fabulous on 
the other. 
