102 



THE CABINET OF NATURAL HISTORY, 



world, — thatis, abeingvvhosemoraland intellectual powers 

 are rei)resented in the subjects of nature, the utilities and 

 ends of which latter are reflected in him, and, as a final 

 cause, take their rise and origin from him, in the scale of 

 creation: and, judging from all that has been said upon this 

 subject, there can be little doubt, that all natural things 

 are subservient as means to things moral and intellectual, 

 so the former, as much as possible, would seem to be made 

 the emblems and representatives in which the latter may 

 be contemplated. 



I have been led to offer these remarks on the final causes 

 of lower existence, because I consider that they are so con- 

 nected with the question of Instinct, that, taken in a gene- 

 ral point of view, they help to determine what sort of 

 limited and subservient powers the brute creation may be 

 expected, a priori, to possess. 



The above idea it appears very necessary to keep in mind, 

 to prevent us from assigning to brutes, mental attributes 

 above the sphere of their common nature, and as leading 

 us to investigate those causes which alone appear properly 

 and rationally adequate to the production of the wonderful 

 system and order observable in their actions. It is from 

 failing to retain steadily in the mind's view this necessary 

 leading principle, that weare led into erroneous conclusions 

 respecting the powers of the brute mind, and the operative 

 means by which the actions of brutes are effected; which 

 so much resemble the operations of human intellect, that as 

 before observed, they may be said to represent and illus- 

 trate them. 



On this account, considerable difficulty has been found in 

 drawing a distinct line betvveen the conscious discrimina- 

 tive powers of brutes, and those of human rationality; and 

 in affixing a true character to the mental principles in which 

 the actions of the brute creation originate. 



Now it seems demonstrable that brutes are possessed of a 

 limited conscious discrimination and determination; which 

 discrimination and determination do not, however,embrace 

 what is either moral, intellectual, or rational, as regards the 

 consciousness of the creature: but as their actions involve 

 in them causes or powers that are evidently of a moral, in- 

 tellectual, and rational order, and which powers evidently 

 act upon the mental constitution of brutes by impressing 

 and guiding their conscious powers of discrimination and 

 determination to action, according to the purposes or final 

 causes of their being: — it may, therefore, be justly inferred 

 that the Divine Energy does in reality act, not imme- 

 diately, but mediately, or through the medium of moral 

 and intellectual influences, upon the nature or consciousness 

 of the creature, in the production of the various, and, in 

 many instances, truly wonderful actions which they perform. 

 If it be asked by what intermediate agency the opera- 



tions of brutes are thus directed; — I reply that it is gene- 

 rally admitted, by a large class of mankind, at least, that 

 superior (yet intermediate) powers of some kind, are in 

 actual connexion \vilh the human mind, — though not lead- 

 ing it blindly, as might be supposed to be the case with re- 

 gard to Ijrutes; — and if this be admitted, there remains no 

 reasonable ground for denying the connexion and influence 

 of similar powers, (wjiatcver they may be,) operating upon 

 anddisj)osing to certain ends thcconscious naturcsof brutes; 

 which natures, if we suppose them destitute of moral and 

 intellectual consciousness, have need of the operation of 

 such powers to direct them. The phenomena of brute ac- 

 tion, indeed, arc inexplicable upon any other grounds, but 

 these once admitted, there appears to be nothing in the 

 whole circle of instinctive operations which may not be 

 satisfactorily accounted for. I will not even venture a sug- 

 gestion as to the nature of the intermediate superior powers 

 here alluded to; but their agenc)-, I repeat, is plainly mani- 

 fest in the conduct of brutes. 



Viewed, then, in this light, and explained in this man- 

 ner, Providence is conspicuous in the operations of brute 

 nature; and it is but reasonable to conclude that the Divine 

 Being does indeed operate, by unseen mediums, of what- 

 ever kind they be, as the Great Regulator of the whole. 



Facts have undoubtedly occurred to exemplif}^ the opera- 

 tion of such agency in special interferences of Providence, 

 through the medium of the brute mind; of which the fol- 

 lowing well authenticated instance must be regarded as a 

 very striking one. 



At Ditchlcy, near Blenheim, now the scat of Viscount 

 Dillon, but formerly of the Lees, Earls of Lichfield, is a 

 ]5ortrait of Sir Heni-y Lee, by Jansen, with that of a mas- 

 tiff dog which saved his life. One of Sir Henry's servants 

 had formed the design of assassinating his masler, and rob- 

 bing the house; but on the night he had intended to perpe- 

 trate it, the dog, for the first time, followed Sir Henry up 

 stairs, took his station under his bed, and could not be 

 driven thence; in the dead of the night, the servant, not 

 knowinij the dog was there, entered the roojn to execute his 

 diabolical purpose; but was instantly seized by the dog, and 

 being secured, confessed his intentions. In a corner of the 

 picture arc these lines: 



But in my dog, ^Tlle^oo^I made no store, 

 I find more love llian those I trusted more. 



What an instance is this to show the operation of a supe- 

 rior moral and intellectual power disposing the inclinations 

 and perceptions of an animal, for a stated end; while the 

 natural volitions of the creature, were at the same time ex- 

 ercised by itin freedom towards thefurlhcrancc of thisend! 

 Whether we suppose the immediate means made use of to 

 impress the animal's conscious mind, to be that of an ideal 



