104 



THE CABINET OF NATURAL HISTORY. 



fie; to which latter piinciplcs alone design can properly be 

 referred. If the appearances of design in tlie animals be 

 taken as proofs of such design being proper to them, we 

 must be forced to admit that they are possessed of moral, 

 intellectual and scientific i^eficction: but we might, upon 

 this principle, argue the same thing of the plant, which, 

 when placed in a cellar where but a partial light is admit- 

 ted, turns itself towards the i-ay; namely, that as there is 

 the appeara}ice of design in the action, we must therefore 

 attribute design to the sulyectin which we perceive its ef- 

 fects, and thus elevate the vegetable to the intellectual 

 sphere: and we should actually do this, did we not stop 

 short to consider the adequacy of the apparent agent to the 

 production of the effect, as we behold it performed. 



It becomes necessar}', then, to establish a test whereby 

 the operation of ihe moral, intellectual and scientific powers 

 here alluded to, may be ascertained; and whereby the line 

 of demarcation may be distinctly drawn between man and 

 brute. This lest, I conceive, is included in the following 

 propositions; viz. 1st, That moral qualities do not become 

 objective in the minds of brutes; or, that the moral actions 

 which they perform are not reflected upon or contrived by 

 them as such; thus that they possess no moi'al conscious- 

 ness, and consequently that no moral design can be attribut- 

 ed to them; and therefore, that so much of moral design as 

 appears conspicuous in their actions must be the effect of 

 moral powers or energies acting upon them in a region of 

 their minds above Ihe s])hercof their proper consciousness. 

 2d, That intellectual and scientific qualities do not become 

 objective in the minds of brutes; or, that the intellectual and 

 scientific actions which they perform, are not reflected upon 

 or contrived by them as such; thus that they possess no in- 

 tellectual or scientific consciousness, and consequently that 

 no intellectual or scientific design can be attributed to them: 

 and therefore that so much of intellectual or scientific de- 

 sign as appears conspicuous in their actions, must be the ef- 

 fect of intellectual and scientific powers or energies, acting 

 upon them in a region of their minds above the sphere of 

 their proper consciousness. 



Admiring and respecting as I do the endeavours of all 

 who arc engaged in the promotion of philosophic inquiries, 

 I cannot but think, that in the particular subject before us, 

 too much has been done to confound the natures of man 

 and brute, and to separate both from the fountain of their 

 existence. Man is what he is, and derives his superiority 

 over the brute creation, from the circumstance that all 

 things whateverbecome morally and scientifically objective 

 to him; and the brute is what he is, and derives his infe- 

 riority, from tlie total absence of this distinguished and en- 

 nobling faculty. It is true that many specious arguments 

 may be and have been advanced to prove that the brutes 



participate in human rationality, in kind, if not in degree; 

 but the ends which their natures are evidently destined to 

 fulfil, would be, one might imagine, alone sufficient to re- 

 fute the supposition. For it is but reasonable to conclude, 

 that the conscious powers of the creature will be according 

 to the ends of its existence; and as these ends are in 

 the brute creation neither moral nor scientific, but pure- 

 ly natural, and, as regards themselves, only subservient 

 to whatis moral and scientific, it thence would follow that 

 they are not possessed in themselves of any moral, intel- 

 lectual, or scientific conscious powers; — and are therefore 

 merely natural agents of a secondary class, in which such 

 powers are exhibited. 



I proceed to consider the first of the foregoing proposi- 

 tions. When we investigate the many and surprising in- 

 stances in which the operations of the brute creation imply 

 moral intention, reflection, and contrivance, we are at no 

 loss to account for the opinion of that class of philosophers, 

 who have attributed the mental inferiority of brutes to the 

 mere want of adequate bodily organs; nevertheless, the in- 

 tellectual consciousness of man shrinks fi'om the acknow- 

 ledgment that in one common principle of life originate the 

 actions of man and brute: and that brutes, as to their mental 

 constitution, are thus, as it were, " human imps lopt off 

 from the common slock of intellect and rationality." 

 There is something which seems powerfully to oppose the 

 sentiment of sharing those high endowments with crea- 

 tures of so inferior a nature; and which irresistibly leads 

 us seriously to examine the argum.ents which may be 

 offered to prove that moral and intellectual powers reign 

 over the conscious perception of tite brute, and guide it to 

 its proper exercise of those lower faculties, which it is left 

 in freedom to use. The bee, we sa}^ is a perfect political 

 moralist, with respect to its actions, which evince the strict- 

 est attention to the principles of order and economy, for 

 the purposes of the establishment and preservation of a 

 community; yet it is totally ignorant and unconscious of 

 the very principles which it is so assiduous in the practice 

 of; — not a ray of moral ])crcc])tion or consciousness can be 

 attributed to it in a proper sense; it is, on the contrary, to- 

 tally destitute of the means of discei'ning or reflecting upon 

 the nature or order of the ends it is instrumental in accom- 

 plishing, through the medium of its suliordinate voluntary 

 perceptions and powers. — Although it is in the habit of ex- 

 ercising the most accurate science and means, for the fulfil- 

 ment of these ends, it 3'ct cannot look down with an ap- 

 proving or disapproving perception upon the region or 

 sphere of its natural powers; it evidently has no perception 

 of any moral superiority in itself over the most vulgar 

 worm that crawls. But if brute creatures were capable of 

 moral consciousness, they would be capable of elevation in 



