AND AMERICAN RURAL SPORTS. 



105 



the scale of being; and this little insect, the bee, judging 

 from its actions, would, were it capable of that species of 

 consciousness, notonl)^ rank above most of the larger classes 

 of animals, but would, on the score of fidelity and integ- 

 rity, put human nature to the blush. 



Were it not that much has been said in favour of the al- 

 leged moral consciousness of brutes, it might perhaps be im- 

 pertinent to proceed furtherin the endeavour to disproveit; 

 but so strong are appearances in its favour, that, although 

 we deny the affirmative in the abstract, by an unequivocal 

 assent to the proposition, that brutes are not accountable 

 beings; yet we are too ready to admit it in particular in- 

 stances, in which we are wont to ascribe a moral conscious- 

 ness to the particular moral action we see performed by an 

 animal. There is a strong tendency to mistake the cause 

 instrumental for the cause principal, in this as in other 

 cases; by which we are insensibly led to assign the sum 

 total of the attribute to the visible agent, without stopping 

 to consider further of the matter. Thus gratitude, which 

 is a moral quality in man, is thought to be moral also in the 

 dog; but surely no one, upon mature consideration of the 

 subject, will imagine that the dog reflects on the inclination 

 or desire he feels to act in a manner which we view as grate- 

 ful, and that he is pleased with the survey and reflection; — 

 that the moral quality of his actions becomes objective to 

 him; — and j^et this is absolutely necessary in order to con- 

 stitute a moral consciousness; for, to effect this, it is not 

 only necessary that the action be outwardly, or in effect 

 moral, but that this moral actioii be reflected upon as such, 

 in order that its moral quality may be thus perceived and 

 felt. Moral consciousness can only be produced by the 

 moral quality of the action becoming objective — byitsbeing 

 reflected upon from a superior eminence, and in a superior 

 light, — by a soul within and above the lower, animal, or 

 natural mind. But that brutes do not possess this higher 

 conscious faculty, or soul, is made evident by this; — that if 

 a particular individual of a species did possess it, such indi- 

 vidual would be necessarily raised by it, as to its nature, 

 which does not, in any case, occur. Thus, with respect to 

 the gratitude and fidelity of the dog, no greater apparent 

 moral sagacity can be exercised by any animal; yet being 

 totally unable to contemplate his gratitude or fidelity in the 

 abstract, as objects of a superior perception and conscious- 

 ness, those virtues are to him as if they existed not: — to 

 man alone this moral consciousness is proper, to the animal 

 it is absolutely a nonentity; he is not in the smallest degree 

 more moral on account of his apparent moral qualities, for 

 they are indeed only apparently his own, because they do 

 not reach down, if I may be allowed the expression, to the 

 seat of his proper consciousness; but consist in powers or 

 energies which act above it: he possesses an apparent 



moral sagacity, but without any moral consciousness or per- 

 ception concerning it. To make this plain by an example: 

 the dog, if he saves his master from drowning, or preserves 

 his life in any more remarkable manner, such as that in the 

 instance we have before related, reflects not upon any 

 moral nobleness or disinterestedness in the action; he is not 

 at all the more refined for having performed an action, 

 which, morally considered, would tend to raise his nature; 

 on the contrary, he lives on as before, like the rest of his 

 canine brethren, in no respect more elevated in the scale 

 of being; and yet it is certain that in this action his highest 

 natural powers of proper volition, and mental discrimina- 

 tion and comparison, which we may term moral sagacity, 

 have been brought into full exercise. 



But it will, perhaps, be objected, that animals experience 

 delight in the exercise of moral qualities, as such; the dog, 

 for instance, in gratitude. I answer, that every animal 

 must necessarily have a delight annexed to that exercise of 

 its powers by which it fulfils the end of its being: and the 

 dog, as the natural guardian of man, has natural inclinations 

 implanted in him, for the purpose of rendering him such; 

 but his delight in the exercise of the inclinations, even 

 when they are directed to moral acts, is purely natural, 

 and in no wise moral; for, as already observed, no one in 

 this case will imagine that the dog either reflects upon his 

 gratitude, or is pleased with it as a moral quality. On the 

 contrary, it is plain that the animal's delight is solely owing 

 to its conscious mind being determined to the exercise of 

 its natural qualities or inclinations, which are those of mo- 

 rally unconscious obedience and friendship to man; this 

 being the end for which he is created. 



The horse, who in his aptitude for war, discovers a 

 quality necessary to render him instrumental in redress- 

 ing the injuries of man, is characterized as an emulous and 

 a generous animal; yet neither generosity nor emulation, 

 considered as moral qualities, are objects of reflection to 

 him; if they were, miserable indeed would be the fate of 

 the devoted charger, whose latter existence is spent in the 

 metamorphosis of a poor, patient, unpitied hack. But in 

 the adorable economy of the Creator, it is provided that 

 the sufferings of this noble animal shall be natural merely: 

 he is incapable of being made conscious by reflection, either 

 of the generosity, the emulation, or the pride, which his 

 actions may have exibited: although he has shown them 

 all, they have not become objective to him, inasmuch as he 

 is unfurnished with a morally conscious soul, by which 

 alone this could be effected; and it is happy for him that 

 neither glory nor emulation can be attributed to him, other- 

 wise than as the unconscious subject in which those high 

 qualities are exhibited. 



The mutual fidelity between the sexes, observable in 



