106 



THE CABINET OF NATURAL HISTORY, 



doves and other birds, forms a distinguished feature in 

 moral instinct; yet we cannot suppose that the virtue of 

 chastity or of conjugal fidelity is at all intended by the crea- 

 ture, or attributable to it; although its actions are precisely 

 the same as if such moral end were contemplated and in- 

 tended by it: the polygamous species, indeed, have a claim 

 equally as good as the monogamous, to the virtue of chastity, 

 as far as regards their own conscious culture. But surely 

 there must be moral powers which act upon and guide the 

 natures of animals in order to produce these effects, while 

 the creature is accessary, in apparent freedom, and uncon- 

 scious of the power tlius exerted on it; the wonderful ex- 

 hibition of conjugal and social affections in some species of 

 marine animals, in the Trichechi Boreales, for instance, is 

 altogether superior to what can be explained upon any other 

 principles; they will die in protecting their mates and each 

 other. In their manners they are peaceable and harmless, 

 bearing the strongest attachment to each other; but when 

 attacked, some will strive to overset the boat, by going be- 

 neath it; others fling themselves on the rope of the hook by 

 which their comrade is held, and endeavour to break it; 

 while others again make efforts to wrench the instrument 

 out of the body of their wounded companion: none desert 

 him, but persist in their courageous efforts for his rescue, 

 even to the last! Their attachment to their mates is, if 

 possible, still more astonishing, and cannot be contemplated 

 without exciting the most vivid sympathy and admiration. 

 It is indeed the most perfect lesson of fidelity and heroic 

 devotion. If in this case we could suppose the creatures 

 capable of reflecting upon the nature of their actions, which 

 are the evident results of a moral influence, what must we 

 think of them? — or rather, what must we not think of 

 them? For it is to be observed, that this conduct is adapt- 

 ed to circumstances, and discovers an apparent rational 

 discrimination, as well as an apparent moral consciovs- 

 7-iess, in the means employed by the creatures towards the 

 accomplishment of the ends which the exigency suggests. 

 The controlling energies which direct the limited con- 

 scious powers of brute creatures to particular ends, are 

 wonderfully displayed again in the economy of the cuckoo, 

 which lays its eggs in the nest of the hedge-sparrow, and in 

 those of other small birds; these birds, so far from molest- 

 ing the young intruder, — who, in a singularly curious man- 

 ner, expels its companions, the small birds' progeny, from 

 the nest, in order that itself may be exclusively and ade- 

 quately fed by the parents, — feed and cherish it, till it ar- 

 rives at nearly its full growth; that is, until it is four or 

 five times the size of the foster-parents. The cuckoo, as 

 if conscious that one of her overgrown nurslings would be 

 quite sufficient for the hedge-sparrow or wagtail to attend 

 to and provide for, although she lays several eggs, deposits 



them in as many strange nests, belonging to these little 

 birds; for she never builds herself: she acts, in fact, as if 

 she calculated exactly what should and what would be 

 done by others, for the rearing of her progeny. Another 

 very curious circumstance noticed by Dr. Jenner, in con- 

 nection witli his remarks on the natural history of the 

 cuckoo, if the power exercised by birds, — which, he says, 

 may arise from ' ' some hidden cause in the animal econo- 

 '>ny," — cither of retarding or of accelerating the pro- 

 duction of tlieir eggs, according to cii"cumstances. Moral 

 and intellectual design and active energy, above the con- 

 scious faculties of the creature, is surely evident in all this; 

 for the creature is not a mere piece of mechanism, but has 

 a manifest conscious freedom in the performance of its 

 peculiar natural acts; but which freedom is thus as mani- 

 festly controlled by superior influences, of which it is un- 

 conscious. How, otherwise, can we possibly account for 

 the incessant endeavours of the young cuckoo to dislodge 

 its fellow inmates of the nest, while, as yet, it has scarcely 

 extricated itself from the egg: it cannot reflect upon the 

 necessity of its operations, either for ultimate preservation, 

 or for present convenience; yet it acts as if it did, and 

 takes the most effectual means for the accomplishment of 

 those ends. Will those who attribute design to such ac- 

 tions, say, that the design of taking the immediate steps 

 necessary for the preservation of the creature can reside 

 within its own consciousness? It surely cannot. The 

 final purposes which are the primary motives of its ac- 

 tions, are far above what it can either conceive or survey; 

 otherwise the cuckoo must indeed be a "7'ara avisinter- 

 7-is," a feathered philosopher of no mean or despicable 

 talent. 



One of the strongest instances of apparent moral sa- 

 gacity, is that well-known one recorded of the elephant, 

 which is said to have taken place in Delhi. An elephant 

 having killed his Cornac, or governor, it is related that the 

 man's wife, in despair, threw her two children before the 

 animal, saying, " Now you have destroyed their father, 

 you may as well put an end to their lives and mine," — 

 upon which the animal, relenting, and taking up the big- 

 gest of the children with his trunk, placed him upon his 

 neck, and having thus adopted liim for his Cornac, would 

 never afterwards permit any other person to mount him. 

 In this case we cannot suppose the animal to have reflected 

 upon the deed of slaughter he had committed as wrong, 

 nor upon the act of atonement or reconciliation as right, 

 without making him an accountable agent; there are, how- 

 ever, the strongest possible features of right and wrong, in 

 the two acts and their attendant circumstances, which must 

 unquestionably belong to an agency above the proper con- 

 sciousness of the creature. For we have here a case of 



