150 



THE CABINET OF NATURAL HISTORY 



its own consciousness, and which lead it to the perform- 

 ance of actions which, in effect, are moral, as considered 

 objectively by the human mind. 



From a comparison of this view of the nature of the con- 

 sciousness of animals with that of man, the latter agent alone 

 appears capable of considering and appreciating the nature 

 of his own actions, and those of the inferior creation ; he 

 alone is conscious of moral, intellectual, and scientific ener- 

 gies and perceptions; and being, in consequence of this 

 moral and intellectual faculty, at liberty to estimate and 

 direct all lower operations, is in moral and intellectual, as 

 well as in natural freedom ; whereas the brute is in the latter 

 only. From the most dispassionate survey of brute nature, 

 it does not appear that the creatures have any reflex percep- 

 tion respecting the qualities of their own discernment, or of 

 the moral energies, or scientific powers, which tliey dis- 

 play: on the contrary, it appears sufficiently evident that 

 with respect to any perception of their own qualities in the 

 abstract, the wisest is no wiser than the dullest, and the dull- 

 est is equally %vise with the wisest; the most moral as little 

 so as the least, and t<ice versa: the Peacock has no more 

 ])erception of the pride he is famed for, than the Horse or 

 the Lion have of their generosity; than the Fox has of his 

 cunning, or the Tiger of his cruelty. 



From these considerations, there is in appearance the 

 strongest probability that the moral world, good and evil, 

 may be in action upon, although above the stream of, the 

 natural world, or above the consciousness of lower exist- 

 ence; and that the former may thus operate upon the latter 

 as a cause upon an effect. But be this as it may, it appears 

 certain, that moral qualities being objective in the mind of 

 man, he alone is possessed of moral consciousness and moral 

 freedom of action; thus is an inhabitant of both the moral 

 and the natural world; and that as moral qualities do not 

 become objective in the minds of brutes, or as the moral 

 actions which they perform are not reflected upon by them, 

 as such, nor are, in any respect the effects of moral choice 

 and discrimination on their parts, they are therefore not 

 possessed of moral consciousness, nor of moral freedom of 

 action; and thus are not inhabitants of the moral world, — 

 although acted upon by it, — but of the natural world only. 



Having thus concluded my preliminary remarks on the 

 moral qualities exhibited by brutes, I proceed to consider 

 those which arc of an intellectual and scientific character, — 

 to the illustration, consequently, of the second proposition 

 given in a former page. As moral perception appears to be 

 excluded from the conscious sphere of the brute mind, so 

 neither do brutes appear to possess any reflex power of con- 

 templating the principles of intelligence and science by 

 which, or rather according to which, they act. They 

 appear to possess no power of taking an intellectual recog- 

 nizance of this intelligence and science so remarkable in 



many of their actions; and may be considered as possessing 

 only an inferior, or what may be called animal mind, capa- 

 ble of being influenced or directed, but incapable of viewing 

 or appreciating the powers or energies which thus influ- 

 ence and direct it in the most essential of its actions. Man 

 is endowed with the love of science; he, therefore, expe- 

 riences a delight proper to his nature as a scientific agent, 

 from the contemplation of a means which is instrumental in 

 the accomplishment of an end: he is also gifted with the 

 love of usefulness, and therefore receives a moral delight 

 from the accomplishment of the end itself, which science is 

 the means of effecting. Not so the brute: — the architectural 

 contrivance and discrimination of the Beaver, which is ne- 

 vertheless much inferior to that of various species of Ter- 

 mites; — the surprising intelligence of the Hive-bee and 

 others of the Apes; — the ingenious mechanism of the Spi- 

 der: — all these determinations of instinct, which, when 

 viewed in connexion with the animals in whom they are 

 displayed, are so astonishing, form no objects of contem- 

 plation to them, while to the human mind they are the sub- 

 jects of intellectual perception and reflection, advancing in 

 many instances even to sublimity. 



When we observe, in the insect world, in beings appa- 

 rently the most insignificant, an intelligence the most per- 

 fect, presenting the most wonderful foresight, provision, 

 and design, we are led at once to the recognition of this 

 intelligence, as a principle which cannot, with any degree 

 of propriety, be attributed to the creature, as properly its 

 own; and we perceive, that in these instances, thus to attri- 

 bute it to those humble animals, would be to raise them to 

 an eminence far above the most sagacious quadrupeds. 



Innumerable are the instances among insects, in which 

 the agency of intellectual and scientific powers, altogether 

 superior to the proper consciousness of the creatures is to 

 be observed; and it may be remarked, that as we descend 

 in the scale of sentient being, this intellectual agency ap- 

 pears to develop itself in a manner proportionably more 

 wonderful; so as to afford the most substantial evidences of 

 the reality of its existence and operation. 



That Bees exercise the principles of a science, of which 

 they are wholly unconscious, is beautifully exemplified in 

 the construction of their cells; the general form of these, it 

 is well known, is that which includes a greater space than 

 any other which could be given to them, without leaving a 

 void space between the contiguous cells; each of which, 

 from this circumstance, supplies one of the walls of each of 

 the six cells which surround it. But " it is to be remarked, 

 that though the general form of the cells is hexagonal, that 

 of those first begun is pentagonal, the side next the top of 

 the hive, and by which the comb is attached, being much 

 broader than the rest; whence the comb is more strongly 

 united to the hive than if these cells were of the ordinary 



