﻿380 
  SOUTH 
  AMERICAN 
  INDIANS 
  [B. 
  A. 
  E. 
  Bull. 
  143 
  

  

  chief 
  episodes 
  were 
  the 
  campaigns 
  conducted 
  by 
  the 
  Neo-TVica 
  during 
  

   the 
  16th 
  century, 
  and 
  the 
  Indian 
  rebellions 
  of 
  the 
  second 
  half 
  of 
  the 
  

   18th 
  century. 
  In 
  these 
  efforts, 
  Quechua 
  warfare 
  gravitated 
  swiftly 
  

   towards 
  the 
  superior 
  European 
  patterns. 
  To 
  set 
  a 
  measure 
  for 
  the 
  

   rate 
  of 
  acculturation, 
  it 
  will 
  be 
  convenient 
  to 
  review 
  the 
  military 
  

   pattern 
  of 
  the 
  Conquest 
  itself. 
  

  

  The 
  Conquest. 
  — 
  The 
  quick 
  defeat 
  of 
  Atahuallpa 
  by 
  Pizarro 
  at 
  

   Cajamarca 
  on 
  November 
  16, 
  1532, 
  predicates 
  an 
  intricate 
  strategic 
  

   situation 
  (fig. 
  39). 
  Before 
  Cajamarca, 
  the 
  Indians 
  regarded 
  the 
  

   Europeans 
  as 
  marvelous 
  curiosities. 
  The 
  horses 
  were 
  thought 
  to 
  

   have 
  feet 
  of 
  silver, 
  and 
  the 
  firearms 
  were 
  regarded 
  as 
  animate 
  thunder- 
  

   bolts, 
  as 
  in 
  Tumbez, 
  where 
  the 
  chief 
  poured 
  libations 
  of 
  chicha 
  into 
  

   the 
  barrel 
  of 
  Candia's 
  weapon. 
  Yet 
  it 
  was 
  believed 
  that 
  the 
  Spaniards 
  

   were 
  ineffective 
  when 
  dismounted 
  and 
  that 
  the 
  horses 
  were 
  powerless 
  

   at 
  night 
  without 
  their 
  saddles 
  (Zarate, 
  1853, 
  p. 
  476; 
  Pizarro, 
  H., 
  1872, 
  

   p. 
  119). 
  Atahuallpa 
  received 
  advices 
  that 
  the 
  swords 
  were 
  no 
  more 
  

   dangerous 
  than 
  women's 
  weaving 
  battens 
  (Velasco, 
  1841-44, 
  2:89), 
  and 
  

   he 
  was 
  told 
  that 
  the 
  firearms 
  were 
  capable 
  of 
  firing 
  only 
  two 
  shots 
  

   (Oviedo, 
  1851-55, 
  4:165). 
  These 
  reports 
  were 
  possible 
  only 
  because 
  

   the 
  Spaniards 
  had 
  never 
  been 
  forced 
  to 
  deliver 
  their 
  full 
  striking 
  

   power, 
  and 
  Atahuallpa 
  governed 
  his 
  reception 
  of 
  the 
  Spaniards 
  by 
  

   such 
  fragmentary 
  information. 
  Thus, 
  his 
  belief 
  that 
  the 
  horses 
  were 
  

   impotent 
  at 
  night 
  determined 
  his 
  procrastinated 
  entry 
  into 
  Cajamarca 
  

   at 
  dusk 
  on 
  the 
  evening 
  of 
  November 
  16, 
  instead 
  of 
  at 
  noon, 
  as 
  Pizarro 
  

   had 
  been 
  led 
  to 
  expect 
  (Pizarro, 
  H., 
  1872, 
  p. 
  119). 
  It 
  would 
  be 
  under- 
  

   estimating 
  Indian 
  perspicacity 
  to 
  suggest 
  that 
  the 
  illusion 
  of 
  superior 
  

   beings 
  persisted 
  long 
  in 
  the 
  Indian 
  concept 
  of 
  the 
  European. 
  His 
  

   technological 
  equipment 
  was 
  far 
  from 
  mysterious. 
  Horses 
  were 
  not 
  

   vastly 
  different 
  from 
  llamas. 
  Steel 
  was 
  not 
  incomprehensible 
  to 
  a 
  

   people 
  possessing 
  bronze, 
  nor 
  was 
  gunpowder 
  inexplicable 
  to 
  the 
  bow- 
  

   man. 
  The 
  Spanish 
  tactics 
  of 
  deployed 
  forces 
  and 
  enveloping 
  move- 
  

   ments 
  were 
  used 
  by 
  the 
  Indians, 
  and 
  their 
  armies 
  also 
  were 
  trained 
  

   as 
  homogenous 
  units 
  possessing 
  the 
  reflexes 
  necessary 
  for 
  coordinated 
  

   action. 
  The 
  great 
  difficulty, 
  however, 
  lay 
  in 
  reproducing 
  European 
  

   equipment 
  without 
  the 
  necessary 
  antecedent 
  experience 
  of 
  such 
  skills 
  

   as 
  horse 
  breeding 
  and 
  training, 
  or 
  the 
  many 
  intricate 
  and 
  precise 
  

   processes 
  in 
  the 
  manufacture 
  of 
  steel 
  and 
  gunpowder. 
  

  

  That 
  which 
  Atahuallpa 
  fatally 
  underestimated 
  was 
  the 
  ability 
  of 
  the 
  

   Spaniards 
  to 
  receive 
  sea-borne 
  reinforcements. 
  In 
  his 
  experience 
  and 
  

   that 
  of 
  his 
  dynastic 
  predecessors, 
  no 
  Coastal 
  society 
  or 
  state 
  could 
  ex- 
  

   pand 
  beyond 
  the 
  wishes 
  of 
  a 
  unified 
  and 
  powerful 
  Highland 
  group, 
  

   since 
  the 
  ocean 
  at 
  their 
  backs 
  constituted 
  an 
  impassable 
  barrier 
  from 
  

   which 
  no 
  aid 
  could 
  come, 
  and 
  their 
  inland 
  expansion 
  was 
  limited 
  by 
  

   the 
  mountains, 
  where 
  the 
  Highlanders 
  had 
  the 
  strategic 
  advantages, 
  

   such 
  as 
  control 
  of 
  the 
  headwaters 
  of 
  Coastal 
  streams. 
  Atahuallpa, 
  

  

  