﻿382 
  SOUTH 
  AMERICAN 
  INDIANS 
  [B. 
  A. 
  B. 
  Bull. 
  143 
  

  

  of 
  Atahuallpa 
  might 
  never 
  have 
  been 
  realized, 
  for 
  the 
  European 
  surely 
  

   would 
  have 
  been 
  forced 
  sooner 
  or 
  later 
  to 
  spend 
  the 
  huge 
  power 
  of 
  sur- 
  

   prise 
  implicit 
  in 
  the 
  massed 
  use 
  of 
  his 
  weapons 
  in 
  some 
  preparatory- 
  

   engagement 
  rather 
  than 
  against 
  Atahuallpa 
  himself. 
  

  

  The 
  rebellion 
  of 
  Manco 
  Inca. 
  — 
  In 
  1535 
  there 
  were 
  no 
  signs 
  of 
  

   popular 
  resistance 
  to 
  the 
  Conquest 
  at 
  a 
  high 
  level 
  of 
  spontaneous 
  

   action. 
  On 
  the 
  contrary, 
  the 
  only 
  resistance 
  was 
  offered 
  by 
  vestigial 
  

   remnants 
  of 
  the 
  Inca 
  armies 
  (Garcilaso, 
  1722, 
  bk. 
  2, 
  ch. 
  9), 
  and 
  by 
  

   local 
  garrisons 
  which 
  had 
  been 
  assigned 
  to 
  certain 
  areas 
  before 
  the 
  

   Conquest 
  for 
  the 
  maintenance 
  of 
  regional 
  discipline. 
  There 
  was 
  no 
  

   cooperation 
  between 
  these 
  forces 
  : 
  each 
  worked 
  independently 
  in 
  pur- 
  

   suit 
  of 
  its 
  own 
  advantage. 
  

  

  Manco 
  Inca, 
  the 
  young 
  protege" 
  of 
  Pizarro, 
  took 
  it 
  as 
  his 
  mission 
  to 
  

   attempt 
  to 
  weld 
  these 
  residual 
  elements 
  of 
  force 
  into 
  an 
  effective 
  army 
  

   capable 
  of 
  attacking 
  the 
  Europeans 
  simultaneously 
  in 
  many 
  areas. 
  

   On 
  April 
  18, 
  1536, 
  the 
  Indian 
  army 
  converged 
  upon 
  the 
  four 
  ap- 
  

   proaches 
  of 
  Cuzco, 
  and 
  set 
  fire 
  to 
  the 
  outlying 
  buildings, 
  working 
  

   gradually 
  toward 
  the 
  central 
  plaza 
  (Valverde, 
  1879, 
  p. 
  12). 
  As 
  the 
  

   thatched 
  roofs 
  burned 
  away, 
  the 
  Indians 
  gained 
  the 
  double 
  advantage 
  

   of 
  smoking 
  the 
  soldiers 
  from 
  house 
  after 
  house 
  and 
  so 
  driving 
  them 
  to 
  

   the 
  center, 
  as 
  in 
  a 
  hunting 
  party 
  where 
  the 
  quarry 
  is 
  driven 
  by 
  bush- 
  

   beaters 
  to 
  the 
  center 
  of 
  a 
  contracting 
  ring 
  (cf. 
  Cobo, 
  1890-95, 
  4:225- 
  

   26) 
  ; 
  they 
  also 
  gained 
  the 
  advantage 
  of 
  circulating 
  through 
  the 
  city 
  on 
  

   the 
  bare 
  wall 
  tops, 
  high 
  above 
  the 
  cavalry 
  charges 
  launched 
  in 
  the 
  

   streets 
  below 
  (Valverde, 
  1879, 
  p. 
  20). 
  The 
  Spaniards 
  countered 
  this 
  

   last 
  advantage 
  by 
  tearing 
  down 
  the 
  walls 
  of 
  the 
  houses 
  each 
  night 
  when 
  

   the 
  attackers 
  withdrew. 
  But 
  beyond 
  the 
  city's 
  limits, 
  the 
  Indians 
  had 
  

   established 
  elaborate 
  systems 
  of 
  staked 
  pits 
  and 
  barricades, 
  such 
  as 
  the 
  

   one 
  obstructing 
  the 
  road 
  to 
  Lima. 
  On 
  the 
  seventh 
  day 
  of 
  the 
  attack, 
  

   the 
  Spanish 
  situation 
  looked 
  hopeless 
  (Valverde, 
  1879, 
  p. 
  26), 
  but 
  it 
  

   was 
  relieved 
  by 
  a 
  bold 
  sortie 
  and 
  flanking 
  attack 
  upon 
  Sacsahuaman, 
  

   held 
  by 
  only 
  1,500 
  Indians. 
  Sacsahuaman 
  fell 
  on 
  May 
  29, 
  and 
  its 
  

   surrender 
  marked 
  the 
  beginning 
  of 
  the 
  ebb 
  of 
  the 
  Indian 
  revolt 
  from 
  

   the 
  full 
  and 
  promising 
  flood 
  it 
  had 
  reached 
  during 
  the 
  previous 
  weeks. 
  

  

  The 
  siege 
  of 
  Lima 
  was 
  coordinated 
  with 
  the 
  general 
  campaign, 
  to 
  

   take 
  place 
  simultaneously 
  with 
  other 
  attacks. 
  It, 
  too, 
  was 
  conducted 
  

   under 
  orders 
  from 
  Manco, 
  who 
  had 
  arranged 
  that 
  the 
  Indians 
  of 
  the 
  

   neighborhood 
  of 
  Lima 
  itself, 
  reinforced 
  by 
  Highland 
  groups 
  from 
  

   Jauja, 
  should 
  congregate 
  at 
  Pachacamac 
  before 
  advancing 
  upon 
  the 
  

   City 
  of 
  the 
  Kings. 
  There 
  the 
  siege 
  lasted 
  12 
  days 
  (Montesinos, 
  1906, 
  

   1:91-92). 
  The 
  Indians, 
  wearing 
  fine 
  textiles 
  and 
  golden 
  ornaments, 
  

   sought, 
  as 
  in 
  Cuzco, 
  to 
  storm 
  the 
  city 
  by 
  sheer 
  mass, 
  advancing 
  re- 
  

   peatedly 
  from 
  their 
  base 
  on 
  the 
  hill 
  outside 
  Lima, 
  called 
  Cerro 
  San 
  

   Crist 
  6bal, 
  with 
  the 
  object 
  of 
  frightening 
  the 
  Spaniards 
  to 
  take 
  to 
  their 
  

   ships 
  in 
  the 
  harbor 
  beyond. 
  At 
  one 
  point 
  these 
  attacks 
  were 
  so 
  

  

  