﻿Vol.2] 
  COLONIAL 
  QUECHUA 
  — 
  KUBLER 
  383 
  

  

  nearly 
  successful 
  that 
  the 
  Franciscan 
  friars 
  in 
  the 
  city 
  asked 
  leave 
  to 
  

   depart, 
  and 
  Pizarro's 
  Indian 
  wife, 
  Dona 
  Ines, 
  the 
  daughter 
  of 
  Huayna 
  

   Capac, 
  attempted 
  to 
  cross 
  the 
  lines 
  to 
  join 
  the 
  besieging 
  Indians. 
  

   Had 
  the 
  campaign 
  been 
  successful, 
  it 
  was 
  the 
  alleged 
  plan 
  of 
  the 
  

   Indians 
  at 
  the 
  siege 
  of 
  Lima 
  to 
  reconstitute 
  the 
  Inca 
  state 
  and, 
  through 
  

   the 
  Spanish 
  women 
  remaining 
  in 
  Peru, 
  to 
  create 
  a 
  new 
  generation 
  

   combining 
  the 
  virtues 
  of 
  the 
  two 
  races 
  (Valverde, 
  1879, 
  p. 
  80). 
  

  

  The 
  significance 
  of 
  the 
  rebellion 
  of 
  1536-37 
  lies 
  in 
  the 
  fact 
  that 
  it 
  

   was 
  the 
  final 
  Indian 
  attempt 
  to 
  smother 
  concentrated 
  force 
  with 
  over- 
  

   whelming 
  mass. 
  Manco 
  conceived 
  the 
  rebellion, 
  it 
  is 
  true, 
  as 
  a 
  total 
  

   effort 
  in 
  southern 
  Perti, 
  but 
  he 
  employed 
  tactics 
  analogous 
  to 
  those 
  of 
  

   game-beaters. 
  If 
  he 
  succeeded 
  in 
  taking 
  the 
  lives 
  of 
  some 
  800 
  Span- 
  

   iards 
  during 
  the 
  16 
  months 
  of 
  the 
  rebellion, 
  Cuzco 
  held 
  firm, 
  occupied 
  

   by 
  only 
  80 
  horsemen 
  among 
  190 
  Spaniards 
  supported 
  by 
  some 
  hun- 
  

   dreds 
  of 
  Indian 
  warriors, 
  who 
  withstood 
  the 
  pressure 
  of 
  Manco's 
  

   effectives, 
  estimated 
  at 
  180,000 
  men 
  (Levillier, 
  1921-26, 
  2:391-93). 
  

  

  Yet 
  the 
  siege 
  of 
  Cuzco 
  remains 
  a 
  remarkable 
  operation 
  in 
  an 
  exten- 
  

   sive 
  campaign, 
  during 
  which 
  Indian 
  strategy, 
  tactics, 
  and 
  material 
  

   equipment 
  were 
  greatly 
  improved. 
  There 
  was 
  unity 
  of 
  command, 
  

   there 
  were 
  efficient 
  communications 
  with 
  other 
  forces, 
  and 
  improved 
  

   weapons 
  were 
  used, 
  such 
  as 
  the 
  weighted 
  slings 
  (aylyo), 
  strung 
  with 
  

   llama 
  tendons 
  which 
  could 
  not 
  be 
  severed, 
  and 
  designed 
  to 
  entangle 
  

   the 
  legs 
  of 
  the 
  horses. 
  There 
  were 
  also 
  staked 
  pits, 
  retarding 
  forti- 
  

   fications, 
  and 
  ambitious 
  flanking 
  movements. 
  Manco 
  had 
  at 
  his 
  dis- 
  

   posal 
  a 
  certain 
  number 
  of 
  horses 
  and 
  firearms 
  captured 
  from 
  the 
  

   relieving 
  parties 
  sent 
  out 
  of 
  Lima, 
  as 
  well 
  as 
  seven 
  or 
  eight 
  captive 
  

   Europeans 
  who 
  served 
  as 
  grooms, 
  armorers, 
  and 
  powdermakers 
  

   (Herrera, 
  1726-27, 
  vol. 
  5, 
  pp. 
  191, 
  193). 
  

  

  These 
  improvements, 
  nevertheless, 
  were 
  far 
  outbalanced 
  by 
  the 
  

   traditional 
  weaknesses 
  of 
  Inca 
  warfare. 
  For 
  example, 
  the 
  campaign 
  

   at 
  Cuzco 
  displays 
  certain 
  remnants 
  of 
  the 
  ritual 
  behavior 
  of 
  cere- 
  

   monial 
  war 
  (L6pez 
  de 
  G6mara, 
  1749, 
  p. 
  120). 
  Manco's 
  great 
  mass 
  

   attacks 
  were 
  launched 
  periodically 
  at 
  the 
  full 
  moon, 
  when 
  his 
  men 
  

   were 
  at 
  the 
  mercy 
  of 
  the 
  cavalry 
  counter 
  attacks. 
  At 
  all 
  times 
  his 
  

   troops 
  were 
  massed 
  so 
  densely 
  that 
  their 
  pikes 
  were 
  of 
  no 
  avail 
  against 
  

   the 
  horses. 
  Then, 
  at 
  new 
  moon, 
  when 
  the 
  horses 
  would 
  have 
  been 
  

   at 
  disadvantage 
  in 
  the 
  dark 
  night, 
  tbe 
  Indians 
  ceased 
  attacking 
  to 
  

   perform 
  sacrifices 
  to 
  the 
  lunar 
  deity, 
  thus 
  forfeiting 
  the 
  advantage 
  of 
  

   sustained 
  pressure 
  upon 
  the 
  enemy. 
  This 
  20-day 
  rhythm 
  of 
  battle 
  

   was 
  known 
  to 
  the 
  Spaniards, 
  and 
  they 
  exploited 
  it 
  accordingly 
  (Kub- 
  

   ler, 
  1944). 
  

  

  It 
  also 
  became 
  necessary 
  for 
  the 
  Indians 
  periodically 
  to 
  disband 
  

   large 
  forces 
  which 
  were 
  sent 
  in 
  search 
  of 
  food. 
  Indian 
  needs 
  were 
  

   vastly 
  greater 
  than 
  those 
  of 
  the 
  small 
  Spanish 
  force, 
  and 
  after 
  the 
  

   fall 
  of 
  Sacsahuaman 
  it 
  was 
  an 
  easy 
  matter 
  for 
  the 
  Spaniards 
  to 
  gather 
  

  

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