THIRD BIENNIAL STATEMENT 91 



birds, an assertion that is embodied in statute. No doubt it 

 is true that as between a State and its inhabitants the State 

 may regulate the killing and sale of such birds, but it does 

 not follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount pow- 

 ers. To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon 

 a slender reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of any- 

 one; and possession is the beginning of ownership. The 

 whole foundation of the State's rights is the presence within 

 their jurisdiction of birds that yesterday had not arrived, 

 tomorrow may be in another State and in a week a thousand 

 miles away. If we are to be accurate we cannot put the case 

 of the State upon higher ground than that the treaty deals 

 with creatures that for the moment are within the state 

 borders, that it must be carried out by officers of the United 

 States within the same territory, and that but for the treaty 

 the State would be free to regulate this subject itself. 



As most of the laws of the United States are carried out 

 within the States and as many of them deal with matters 

 which in the silence of such laws the State might regulate, 

 such general grounds are not enough to support Missouri's 

 claim. Valid treaties of course ''are as binding within the 

 territorial limits of the States as they are effective through- 

 out the dominion of the United States." Baldwin v. Franks, 

 120 U. S. 678, 683. No doubt the great body of private rela- 

 tions usually fall within the control of the State, but a treaty 

 may override its power. We do not have to invoke the later 

 developments of constitutional law for this proposition; it 

 was recognized as early as Hopkins v. Bell, 3 Cranch. 454, 

 with regard to statutes of limitation, and even earlier, as to 

 confiscation, in Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. 199. It was assumed 

 by Chief Justice Marshall with regard to the escheat of land 

 to the State in Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheaton, 259, 275. Hau- 

 enstein v. Lynham, 100 U. S. 483. Geoffroy v. Riggs, 133 

 U. S. 258. Bhjthe v. Hinckley, 180 U. S. 333, 340. So as 

 to a limited jurisdiction of foreign consuls within a State. 

 Wildenhus' Case, 120 U. S. 1. See Ross v. Mclntyre, 140 

 U. S. 453. Further illustration seems unnecessary, and it 

 only remains to consider the application of establishment 

 rules to the present case. 



Here a national interest of very nearly the first magni- 

 tude is involved. It can be protected only by national action 

 in concert with that of another power. The subject matter 

 is only transitorily within the State and has no permanent 



