Remarks on Remusat's Revieio of Buddhism. 501 



of some uniform composition ; so that the material or immaterial part 

 of the system is superfluous." 



This notion, unless I am mistaken, is to he found at the bottom of 

 most of the Indian systems of philosophy, Brahmanical and Buddhist, 

 connected with a rejection in some shape or other of phenomenal reality, 

 in order to get rid of the difficulty of different properties existing in the 

 cause (whether mind or matter) and in the effect*. 



The assertion that " material effects are subordinate to psycho- 

 logical" is no otherwise a difficulty than as two absolutely dis- 

 tinct substances, or two absolutely distinct classes of phenomena, 

 are assumed to have a real existence ; and I believe that there 

 is scarcely one school of Bauddha philosophers which has not denied 

 the one or the other assumption ; and that the prevalent opinions 

 include a denial of both. All known phenomena may be ascribed to 

 mind or to matter without a palpable contradiction ; nor, with the single 

 exception of extent, is there a physical phenomenon which does not seem 

 to countenance the rejection of phenomenal reality. Hence the doc- 

 trines of Avidya and of Maya ; and I would ask those whose musings 

 are in an impartial strain, whether the Bauddha device be not as good 

 a one as the Brahmanical, to stave off a difficulty which the unaided 

 wit of man is utterly unable to cope with ? 



Questionless, it is not easy, if it be possible, to avoid the use of words 

 equivalent to material and psychological ; but the tenet obviously in- 

 volved in the formal subordination of one to the other class of 

 phenomena, when placed beside the tenet, that all phenomena are homo- 

 genous, at once renders the former a mere trick of words, or creates an 

 irreconcileable contradiction between the two doctrines, and in fact 

 Remusat has here again commingled tenets held exclusively by quite 

 distinct schools of Buddhist philosophy. 



If I have been held accountable for some of the notions above remarked 

 on, I suspect that these my supposed opinions have been opposed by 

 something more substantial than " des arguties mystiques." Remusat 

 expressly says, " M. Hodgson a eu parfaitement raison d' admettre, 

 comme base du systeme entier, l'existence d'un seul etre souverainement 



* Remusat desired to know how the Buddhists reconcile multiplicity with unity- 

 relative with absolute, imperfect with perfect, variable with eternal, nature with 

 intelligence ? 



I answer ; by the hypothesis of two modes — one of quiescence, the other of acti- 

 vity. But when he joins " l'esprit et la mature" to the rest of his antitheses, I 

 must beg leave to say the question is entirely altered, and must recommend th e 

 captious to a consideration of the extract given in the text from a European philo- 

 sopher of eminence. Not that I have any sympathy with that extravagance, but 

 that I wish merely to state the case fairly for the Buddhists. 



